openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 37 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/io_uring/loop.h b/io_uring/loop.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4dd4fb3ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/loop.h
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#ifndef IOU_LOOP_H
+#define IOU_LOOP_H
+
+#include <linux/io_uring_types.h>
+
+struct iou_loop_params {
+	/*
+	 * The CQE index to wait for. Only serves as a hint and can still be
+	 * woken up earlier.
+	 */
+	__u32			cq_wait_idx;
+};
+
+enum {
+	IOU_LOOP_CONTINUE = 0,
+	IOU_LOOP_STOP,
+};
+
+static inline bool io_has_loop_ops(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return data_race(ctx->loop_step);
+}
+
+int io_run_loop(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx);
+
+static inline struct iou_ctx *io_loop_mangle_ctx(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return (struct iou_ctx *)ctx;
+}
+
+static inline struct io_ring_ctx *io_loop_demangle_ctx(struct iou_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return (struct io_ring_ctx *)ctx;
+}
+
+#endif