diff options
| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /io_uring/loop.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/loop.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | io_uring/loop.c | 91 |
1 files changed, 91 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/loop.c b/io_uring/loop.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bbbb6ef14 --- /dev/null +++ b/io_uring/loop.c @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#include "io_uring.h" +#include "wait.h" +#include "loop.h" + +static inline int io_loop_nr_cqes(const struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, + const struct iou_loop_params *lp) +{ + return lp->cq_wait_idx - READ_ONCE(ctx->rings->cq.tail); +} + +static inline void io_loop_wait_start(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, unsigned nr_wait) +{ + atomic_set(&ctx->cq_wait_nr, nr_wait); + set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); +} + +static inline void io_loop_wait_finish(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) +{ + __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); + atomic_set(&ctx->cq_wait_nr, IO_CQ_WAKE_INIT); +} + +static void io_loop_wait(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct iou_loop_params *lp, + unsigned nr_wait) +{ + io_loop_wait_start(ctx, nr_wait); + + if (unlikely(io_local_work_pending(ctx) || + io_loop_nr_cqes(ctx, lp) <= 0) || + READ_ONCE(ctx->check_cq)) { + io_loop_wait_finish(ctx); + return; + } + + mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); + schedule(); + io_loop_wait_finish(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock); +} + +static int __io_run_loop(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct iou_loop_params lp = {}; + + while (true) { + int nr_wait, step_res; + + if (unlikely(!ctx->loop_step)) + return -EFAULT; + + step_res = ctx->loop_step(io_loop_mangle_ctx(ctx), &lp); + if (step_res == IOU_LOOP_STOP) + break; + if (step_res != IOU_LOOP_CONTINUE) + return -EINVAL; + + nr_wait = io_loop_nr_cqes(ctx, &lp); + if (nr_wait > 0) + io_loop_wait(ctx, &lp, nr_wait); + else + nr_wait = 0; + + if (task_work_pending(current)) { + mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); + io_run_task_work(); + mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock); + } + if (unlikely(task_sigpending(current))) + return -EINTR; + io_run_local_work_locked(ctx, nr_wait); + + if (READ_ONCE(ctx->check_cq) & BIT(IO_CHECK_CQ_OVERFLOW_BIT)) + io_cqring_overflow_flush_locked(ctx); + } + + return 0; +} + +int io_run_loop(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) +{ + int ret; + + if (!io_allowed_run_tw(ctx)) + return -EEXIST; + + mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock); + ret = __io_run_loop(ctx); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); + return ret; +} |
