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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /io_uring/loop.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/loop.c')
-rw-r--r--io_uring/loop.c91
1 files changed, 91 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/loop.c b/io_uring/loop.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bbbb6ef14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/loop.c
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#include "io_uring.h"
+#include "wait.h"
+#include "loop.h"
+
+static inline int io_loop_nr_cqes(const struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
+ const struct iou_loop_params *lp)
+{
+ return lp->cq_wait_idx - READ_ONCE(ctx->rings->cq.tail);
+}
+
+static inline void io_loop_wait_start(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, unsigned nr_wait)
+{
+ atomic_set(&ctx->cq_wait_nr, nr_wait);
+ set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
+}
+
+static inline void io_loop_wait_finish(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
+ atomic_set(&ctx->cq_wait_nr, IO_CQ_WAKE_INIT);
+}
+
+static void io_loop_wait(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct iou_loop_params *lp,
+ unsigned nr_wait)
+{
+ io_loop_wait_start(ctx, nr_wait);
+
+ if (unlikely(io_local_work_pending(ctx) ||
+ io_loop_nr_cqes(ctx, lp) <= 0) ||
+ READ_ONCE(ctx->check_cq)) {
+ io_loop_wait_finish(ctx);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+ schedule();
+ io_loop_wait_finish(ctx);
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+}
+
+static int __io_run_loop(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ struct iou_loop_params lp = {};
+
+ while (true) {
+ int nr_wait, step_res;
+
+ if (unlikely(!ctx->loop_step))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ step_res = ctx->loop_step(io_loop_mangle_ctx(ctx), &lp);
+ if (step_res == IOU_LOOP_STOP)
+ break;
+ if (step_res != IOU_LOOP_CONTINUE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ nr_wait = io_loop_nr_cqes(ctx, &lp);
+ if (nr_wait > 0)
+ io_loop_wait(ctx, &lp, nr_wait);
+ else
+ nr_wait = 0;
+
+ if (task_work_pending(current)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+ io_run_task_work();
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+ }
+ if (unlikely(task_sigpending(current)))
+ return -EINTR;
+ io_run_local_work_locked(ctx, nr_wait);
+
+ if (READ_ONCE(ctx->check_cq) & BIT(IO_CHECK_CQ_OVERFLOW_BIT))
+ io_cqring_overflow_flush_locked(ctx);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int io_run_loop(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!io_allowed_run_tw(ctx))
+ return -EEXIST;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+ ret = __io_run_loop(ctx);
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+ return ret;
+}