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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /io_uring/loop.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/loop.c')
-rw-r--r--io_uring/loop.c91
1 files changed, 91 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/loop.c b/io_uring/loop.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bbbb6ef14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/loop.c
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#include "io_uring.h"
+#include "wait.h"
+#include "loop.h"
+
+static inline int io_loop_nr_cqes(const struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
+ const struct iou_loop_params *lp)
+{
+ return lp->cq_wait_idx - READ_ONCE(ctx->rings->cq.tail);
+}
+
+static inline void io_loop_wait_start(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, unsigned nr_wait)
+{
+ atomic_set(&ctx->cq_wait_nr, nr_wait);
+ set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
+}
+
+static inline void io_loop_wait_finish(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
+ atomic_set(&ctx->cq_wait_nr, IO_CQ_WAKE_INIT);
+}
+
+static void io_loop_wait(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct iou_loop_params *lp,
+ unsigned nr_wait)
+{
+ io_loop_wait_start(ctx, nr_wait);
+
+ if (unlikely(io_local_work_pending(ctx) ||
+ io_loop_nr_cqes(ctx, lp) <= 0) ||
+ READ_ONCE(ctx->check_cq)) {
+ io_loop_wait_finish(ctx);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+ schedule();
+ io_loop_wait_finish(ctx);
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+}
+
+static int __io_run_loop(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ struct iou_loop_params lp = {};
+
+ while (true) {
+ int nr_wait, step_res;
+
+ if (unlikely(!ctx->loop_step))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ step_res = ctx->loop_step(io_loop_mangle_ctx(ctx), &lp);
+ if (step_res == IOU_LOOP_STOP)
+ break;
+ if (step_res != IOU_LOOP_CONTINUE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ nr_wait = io_loop_nr_cqes(ctx, &lp);
+ if (nr_wait > 0)
+ io_loop_wait(ctx, &lp, nr_wait);
+ else
+ nr_wait = 0;
+
+ if (task_work_pending(current)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+ io_run_task_work();
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+ }
+ if (unlikely(task_sigpending(current)))
+ return -EINTR;
+ io_run_local_work_locked(ctx, nr_wait);
+
+ if (READ_ONCE(ctx->check_cq) & BIT(IO_CHECK_CQ_OVERFLOW_BIT))
+ io_cqring_overflow_flush_locked(ctx);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int io_run_loop(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!io_allowed_run_tw(ctx))
+ return -EEXIST;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+ ret = __io_run_loop(ctx);
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+ return ret;
+}