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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /io_uring/filetable.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/filetable.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | io_uring/filetable.c | 158 |
1 files changed, 158 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/filetable.c b/io_uring/filetable.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cb1838c9f --- /dev/null +++ b/io_uring/filetable.c @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> +#include <linux/io_uring.h> + +#include <uapi/linux/io_uring.h> + +#include "io_uring.h" +#include "rsrc.h" +#include "filetable.h" + +static int io_file_bitmap_get(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct io_file_table *table = &ctx->file_table; + unsigned long nr = ctx->file_alloc_end; + int ret; + + if (!table->bitmap) + return -ENFILE; + + if (table->alloc_hint < ctx->file_alloc_start || + table->alloc_hint >= ctx->file_alloc_end) + table->alloc_hint = ctx->file_alloc_start; + + do { + ret = find_next_zero_bit(table->bitmap, nr, table->alloc_hint); + if (ret != nr) + return ret; + + if (table->alloc_hint == ctx->file_alloc_start) + break; + nr = table->alloc_hint; + table->alloc_hint = ctx->file_alloc_start; + } while (1); + + return -ENFILE; +} + +bool io_alloc_file_tables(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_file_table *table, + unsigned nr_files) +{ + if (io_rsrc_data_alloc(&table->data, nr_files)) + return false; + table->bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(nr_files, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (table->bitmap) + return true; + io_rsrc_data_free(ctx, &table->data); + return false; +} + +void io_free_file_tables(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_file_table *table) +{ + io_rsrc_data_free(ctx, &table->data); + bitmap_free(table->bitmap); + table->bitmap = NULL; +} + +static int io_install_fixed_file(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct file *file, + u32 slot_index) + __must_hold(&ctx->uring_lock) +{ + struct io_rsrc_node *node; + + if (io_is_uring_fops(file)) + return -EBADF; + if (!ctx->file_table.data.nr) + return -ENXIO; + if (slot_index >= ctx->file_table.data.nr) + return -EINVAL; + + node = io_rsrc_node_alloc(ctx, IORING_RSRC_FILE); + if (!node) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (!io_reset_rsrc_node(ctx, &ctx->file_table.data, slot_index)) + io_file_bitmap_set(&ctx->file_table, slot_index); + + ctx->file_table.data.nodes[slot_index] = node; + io_fixed_file_set(node, file); + return 0; +} + +int __io_fixed_fd_install(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct file *file, + unsigned int file_slot) +{ + bool alloc_slot = file_slot == IORING_FILE_INDEX_ALLOC; + int ret; + + if (alloc_slot) { + ret = io_file_bitmap_get(ctx); + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) + return ret; + file_slot = ret; + } else { + file_slot--; + } + + ret = io_install_fixed_file(ctx, file, file_slot); + if (!ret && alloc_slot) + ret = file_slot; + return ret; +} +/* + * Note when io_fixed_fd_install() returns error value, it will ensure + * fput() is called correspondingly. + */ +int io_fixed_fd_install(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags, + struct file *file, unsigned int file_slot) +{ + struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx; + int ret; + + io_ring_submit_lock(ctx, issue_flags); + ret = __io_fixed_fd_install(ctx, file, file_slot); + io_ring_submit_unlock(ctx, issue_flags); + + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) + fput(file); + return ret; +} + +int io_fixed_fd_remove(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, unsigned int offset) +{ + struct io_rsrc_node *node; + + if (unlikely(!ctx->file_table.data.nr)) + return -ENXIO; + if (offset >= ctx->file_table.data.nr) + return -EINVAL; + + node = io_rsrc_node_lookup(&ctx->file_table.data, offset); + if (!node) + return -EBADF; + io_reset_rsrc_node(ctx, &ctx->file_table.data, offset); + io_file_bitmap_clear(&ctx->file_table, offset); + return 0; +} + +int io_register_file_alloc_range(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, + struct io_uring_file_index_range __user *arg) +{ + struct io_uring_file_index_range range; + u32 end; + + if (copy_from_user(&range, arg, sizeof(range))) + return -EFAULT; + if (check_add_overflow(range.off, range.len, &end)) + return -EOVERFLOW; + if (range.resv || end > ctx->file_table.data.nr) + return -EINVAL; + + io_file_table_set_alloc_range(ctx, range.off, range.len); + return 0; +} |
