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authorJinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>2026-09-08 15:37:42 +0800
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2026-09-17 09:48:42 +0200
commita5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255 (patch)
tree73fef824f9a846cf935869d0dbc5070ef6e2f741 /io_uring/eventfd.c
downloadlinux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.tar.gz
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x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted
When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function, a crash can be triggered. The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues() function: <__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) <__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi <__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12> <__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d <__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax <__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi Which triggers this crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230 Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that call instruction. The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation. During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction, int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally, starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash. Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro. [ mingo: Refined the changelog ] Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step") Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/eventfd.c')
-rw-r--r--io_uring/eventfd.c173
1 files changed, 173 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/eventfd.c b/io_uring/eventfd.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..63fe6e5d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/eventfd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/eventfd.h>
+#include <linux/eventpoll.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring_types.h>
+
+#include "io-wq.h"
+#include "eventfd.h"
+
+struct io_ev_fd {
+ struct eventfd_ctx *cq_ev_fd;
+ unsigned int eventfd_async;
+ /* protected by ->completion_lock */
+ unsigned last_cq_tail;
+ refcount_t refs;
+ atomic_t ops;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+enum {
+ IO_EVENTFD_OP_SIGNAL_BIT,
+};
+
+static void io_eventfd_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+ struct io_ev_fd *ev_fd = container_of(rcu, struct io_ev_fd, rcu);
+
+ eventfd_ctx_put(ev_fd->cq_ev_fd);
+ kfree(ev_fd);
+}
+
+static void io_eventfd_put(struct io_ev_fd *ev_fd)
+{
+ if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ev_fd->refs))
+ call_rcu(&ev_fd->rcu, io_eventfd_free);
+}
+
+static void io_eventfd_do_signal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+ struct io_ev_fd *ev_fd = container_of(rcu, struct io_ev_fd, rcu);
+
+ atomic_andnot(BIT(IO_EVENTFD_OP_SIGNAL_BIT), &ev_fd->ops);
+ eventfd_signal_mask(ev_fd->cq_ev_fd, EPOLL_URING_WAKE);
+ io_eventfd_put(ev_fd);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the caller should put the ev_fd reference, false if not.
+ */
+static bool __io_eventfd_signal(struct io_ev_fd *ev_fd, bool defer)
+{
+ if (!defer && eventfd_signal_allowed()) {
+ eventfd_signal_mask(ev_fd->cq_ev_fd, EPOLL_URING_WAKE);
+ return true;
+ }
+ if (!atomic_fetch_or(BIT(IO_EVENTFD_OP_SIGNAL_BIT), &ev_fd->ops)) {
+ call_rcu_hurry(&ev_fd->rcu, io_eventfd_do_signal);
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Trigger if eventfd_async isn't set, or if it's set and the caller is
+ * an async worker.
+ */
+static bool io_eventfd_trigger(struct io_ev_fd *ev_fd)
+{
+ return !ev_fd->eventfd_async || io_wq_current_is_worker();
+}
+
+void io_eventfd_signal(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, bool cqe_event, bool defer)
+{
+ bool skip = false;
+ struct io_ev_fd *ev_fd;
+ struct io_rings *rings;
+
+ guard(rcu)();
+
+ rings = rcu_dereference(ctx->rings_rcu);
+ if (!rings)
+ return;
+ if (READ_ONCE(rings->cq_flags) & IORING_CQ_EVENTFD_DISABLED)
+ return;
+ ev_fd = rcu_dereference(ctx->io_ev_fd);
+ /*
+ * Check again if ev_fd exists in case an io_eventfd_unregister call
+ * completed between the NULL check of ctx->io_ev_fd at the start of
+ * the function and rcu_read_lock.
+ */
+ if (!ev_fd)
+ return;
+ if (!io_eventfd_trigger(ev_fd) || !refcount_inc_not_zero(&ev_fd->refs))
+ return;
+
+ if (cqe_event) {
+ /*
+ * Eventfd should only get triggered when at least one event
+ * has been posted. Some applications rely on the eventfd
+ * notification count only changing IFF a new CQE has been
+ * added to the CQ ring. There's no dependency on 1:1
+ * relationship between how many times this function is called
+ * (and hence the eventfd count) and number of CQEs posted to
+ * the CQ ring.
+ */
+ spin_lock(&ctx->completion_lock);
+ skip = ctx->cached_cq_tail == ev_fd->last_cq_tail;
+ ev_fd->last_cq_tail = ctx->cached_cq_tail;
+ spin_unlock(&ctx->completion_lock);
+ }
+
+ if (skip || __io_eventfd_signal(ev_fd, defer))
+ io_eventfd_put(ev_fd);
+}
+
+int io_eventfd_register(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *arg,
+ unsigned int eventfd_async)
+{
+ struct io_ev_fd *ev_fd;
+ __s32 __user *fds = arg;
+ int fd;
+
+ ev_fd = rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->io_ev_fd,
+ lockdep_is_held(&ctx->uring_lock));
+ if (ev_fd)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&fd, fds, sizeof(*fds)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ ev_fd = kmalloc_obj(*ev_fd);
+ if (!ev_fd)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ev_fd->cq_ev_fd = eventfd_ctx_fdget(fd);
+ if (IS_ERR(ev_fd->cq_ev_fd)) {
+ int ret = PTR_ERR(ev_fd->cq_ev_fd);
+
+ kfree(ev_fd);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ spin_lock(&ctx->completion_lock);
+ ev_fd->last_cq_tail = ctx->cached_cq_tail;
+ spin_unlock(&ctx->completion_lock);
+
+ ev_fd->eventfd_async = eventfd_async;
+ ctx->int_flags |= IO_RING_F_HAS_EVFD;
+ refcount_set(&ev_fd->refs, 1);
+ atomic_set(&ev_fd->ops, 0);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->io_ev_fd, ev_fd);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int io_eventfd_unregister(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ struct io_ev_fd *ev_fd;
+
+ ev_fd = rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->io_ev_fd,
+ lockdep_is_held(&ctx->uring_lock));
+ if (ev_fd) {
+ ctx->int_flags &= ~IO_RING_F_HAS_EVFD;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->io_ev_fd, NULL);
+ io_eventfd_put(ev_fd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return -ENXIO;
+}