openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 103 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/io_uring/epoll.c b/io_uring/epoll.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b9db8bde2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/epoll.c
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
+#include <linux/eventpoll.h>
+
+#include <uapi/linux/io_uring.h>
+
+#include "io_uring.h"
+#include "epoll.h"
+
+struct io_epoll {
+	struct file			*file;
+	int				epfd;
+	int				op;
+	int				fd;
+	struct epoll_event		event;
+};
+
+struct io_epoll_wait {
+	struct file			*file;
+	int				maxevents;
+	struct epoll_event __user	*events;
+};
+
+int io_epoll_ctl_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe)
+{
+	struct io_epoll *epoll = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_epoll);
+
+	if (sqe->buf_index || sqe->splice_fd_in)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	epoll->epfd = READ_ONCE(sqe->fd);
+	epoll->op = READ_ONCE(sqe->len);
+	epoll->fd = READ_ONCE(sqe->off);
+
+	if (ep_op_has_event(epoll->op)) {
+		struct epoll_event __user *ev;
+
+		ev = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr));
+		if (copy_from_user(&epoll->event, ev, sizeof(*ev)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int io_epoll_ctl(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
+{
+	struct io_epoll *ie = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_epoll);
+	bool force_nonblock = issue_flags & IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK;
+	struct epoll_key key;
+	int ret;
+
+	CLASS(fd, f)(ie->epfd);
+	if (fd_empty(f))
+		return -EBADF;
+
+	CLASS(fd, tf)(ie->fd);
+	if (fd_empty(tf))
+		return -EBADF;
+
+	key.file = fd_file(tf);
+	key.fd = ie->fd;
+	ret = do_epoll_ctl_file(fd_file(f), ie->op, &key, &ie->event, force_nonblock);
+	if (force_nonblock && ret == -EAGAIN)
+		return -EAGAIN;
+
+	if (ret < 0)
+		req_set_fail(req);
+	io_req_set_res(req, ret, 0);
+	return IOU_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+int io_epoll_wait_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe)
+{
+	struct io_epoll_wait *iew = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_epoll_wait);
+
+	if (sqe->off || sqe->rw_flags || sqe->buf_index || sqe->splice_fd_in)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	iew->maxevents = READ_ONCE(sqe->len);
+	iew->events = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int io_epoll_wait(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
+{
+	struct io_epoll_wait *iew = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_epoll_wait);
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = epoll_sendevents(req->file, iew->events, iew->maxevents);
+	if (ret == 0)
+		return -EAGAIN;
+	if (ret < 0)
+		req_set_fail(req);
+
+	io_req_set_res(req, ret, 0);
+	return IOU_COMPLETE;
+}