summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/io_uring/cmd_net.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /io_uring/cmd_net.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/cmd_net.c')
-rw-r--r--io_uring/cmd_net.c192
1 files changed, 192 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/cmd_net.c b/io_uring/cmd_net.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7cd411fc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/cmd_net.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring/net.h>
+#include <linux/errqueue.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+
+#include "uring_cmd.h"
+#include "io_uring.h"
+
+static int io_uring_cmd_get_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, int op)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+ struct proto *prot = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_prot);
+ int ret, arg = 0;
+
+ if (!prot || !prot->ioctl)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ ret = prot->ioctl(sk, op, &arg);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return arg;
+}
+
+static inline int io_uring_cmd_getsockopt(struct socket *sock,
+ struct io_uring_cmd *cmd,
+ unsigned int issue_flags)
+{
+ const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe = cmd->sqe;
+ bool compat = !!(issue_flags & IO_URING_F_COMPAT);
+ int optlen, optname, level, err;
+ void __user *optval;
+
+ level = READ_ONCE(sqe->level);
+ if (level != SOL_SOCKET)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ optval = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->optval));
+ optname = READ_ONCE(sqe->optname);
+ optlen = READ_ONCE(sqe->optlen);
+
+ err = do_sock_getsockopt(sock, compat, level, optname,
+ USER_SOCKPTR(optval),
+ KERNEL_SOCKPTR(&optlen));
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* On success, return optlen */
+ return optlen;
+}
+
+static inline int io_uring_cmd_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
+ struct io_uring_cmd *cmd,
+ unsigned int issue_flags)
+{
+ const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe = cmd->sqe;
+ bool compat = !!(issue_flags & IO_URING_F_COMPAT);
+ int optname, optlen, level;
+ void __user *optval;
+ sockptr_t optval_s;
+
+ optval = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->optval));
+ optname = READ_ONCE(sqe->optname);
+ optlen = READ_ONCE(sqe->optlen);
+ level = READ_ONCE(sqe->level);
+ optval_s = USER_SOCKPTR(optval);
+
+ return do_sock_setsockopt(sock, compat, level, optname, optval_s,
+ optlen);
+}
+
+static bool io_process_timestamp_skb(struct io_uring_cmd *cmd, struct sock *sk,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned issue_flags)
+{
+ struct sock_exterr_skb *serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
+ struct io_uring_cqe cqe[2];
+ struct io_timespec *iots;
+ struct timespec64 ts;
+ u32 tstype, tskey;
+ int ret;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct io_uring_cqe) != sizeof(struct io_timespec));
+
+ ret = skb_get_tx_timestamp(skb, sk, &ts);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ tskey = serr->ee.ee_data;
+ tstype = serr->ee.ee_info;
+
+ cqe->user_data = 0;
+ cqe->res = tskey;
+ cqe->flags = IORING_CQE_F_MORE | ctx_cqe32_flags(cmd_to_io_kiocb(cmd)->ctx);
+ cqe->flags |= tstype << IORING_TIMESTAMP_TYPE_SHIFT;
+ if (ret == SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_HARDWARE)
+ cqe->flags |= IORING_CQE_F_TSTAMP_HW;
+
+ iots = (struct io_timespec *)&cqe[1];
+ iots->tv_sec = ts.tv_sec;
+ iots->tv_nsec = ts.tv_nsec;
+ return io_uring_cmd_post_mshot_cqe32(cmd, issue_flags, cqe);
+}
+
+static int io_uring_cmd_timestamp(struct socket *sock,
+ struct io_uring_cmd *cmd,
+ unsigned int issue_flags)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+ struct sk_buff_head *q = &sk->sk_error_queue;
+ struct sk_buff *skb, *tmp;
+ struct sk_buff_head list;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!(issue_flags & IO_URING_F_CQE32))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ret = io_cmd_poll_multishot(cmd, issue_flags, EPOLLERR);
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ return ret;
+
+ if (skb_queue_empty_lockless(q))
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ __skb_queue_head_init(&list);
+
+ scoped_guard(spinlock_irq, &q->lock) {
+ skb_queue_walk_safe(q, skb, tmp) {
+ /* don't support skbs with payload */
+ if (!skb_has_tx_timestamp(skb, sk) || skb->len)
+ continue;
+ __skb_unlink(skb, q);
+ __skb_queue_tail(&list, skb);
+ }
+ }
+
+ while (1) {
+ skb = skb_peek(&list);
+ if (!skb)
+ break;
+ if (!io_process_timestamp_skb(cmd, sk, skb, issue_flags))
+ break;
+ __skb_dequeue(&list);
+ consume_skb(skb);
+ }
+
+ if (!unlikely(skb_queue_empty(&list))) {
+ scoped_guard(spinlock_irqsave, &q->lock)
+ skb_queue_splice(&list, q);
+ }
+ return -EAGAIN;
+}
+
+static int io_uring_cmd_getsockname(struct socket *sock,
+ struct io_uring_cmd *cmd,
+ unsigned int issue_flags)
+{
+ const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe = cmd->sqe;
+ struct sockaddr __user *uaddr;
+ unsigned int peer;
+ int __user *ulen;
+
+ if (sqe->ioprio || sqe->__pad1 || sqe->len || sqe->rw_flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ uaddr = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr));
+ ulen = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr3));
+ peer = READ_ONCE(sqe->optlen);
+ if (peer > 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return do_getsockname(sock, peer, uaddr, ulen);
+}
+
+int io_uring_cmd_sock(struct io_uring_cmd *cmd, unsigned int issue_flags)
+{
+ struct socket *sock = cmd->file->private_data;
+
+ switch (cmd->cmd_op) {
+ case SOCKET_URING_OP_SIOCINQ:
+ return io_uring_cmd_get_sock_ioctl(sock, SIOCINQ);
+ case SOCKET_URING_OP_SIOCOUTQ:
+ return io_uring_cmd_get_sock_ioctl(sock, SIOCOUTQ);
+ case SOCKET_URING_OP_GETSOCKOPT:
+ return io_uring_cmd_getsockopt(sock, cmd, issue_flags);
+ case SOCKET_URING_OP_SETSOCKOPT:
+ return io_uring_cmd_setsockopt(sock, cmd, issue_flags);
+ case SOCKET_URING_OP_TX_TIMESTAMP:
+ return io_uring_cmd_timestamp(sock, cmd, issue_flags);
+ case SOCKET_URING_OP_GETSOCKNAME:
+ return io_uring_cmd_getsockname(sock, cmd, issue_flags);
+ default:
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(io_uring_cmd_sock);