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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /io_uring/cancel.h
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/cancel.h')
-rw-r--r--io_uring/cancel.h49
1 files changed, 49 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/cancel.h b/io_uring/cancel.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1b201a094
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/cancel.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#ifndef IORING_CANCEL_H
+#define IORING_CANCEL_H
+
+#include <linux/io_uring_types.h>
+
+struct io_cancel_data {
+ struct io_ring_ctx *ctx;
+ u64 data;
+ struct file *file;
+ u8 opcode;
+ u32 flags;
+ int seq;
+};
+
+int io_async_cancel_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_async_cancel(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+
+int io_try_cancel(struct io_uring_task *tctx, struct io_cancel_data *cd,
+ unsigned int issue_flags);
+
+int io_sync_cancel(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *arg);
+bool io_cancel_req_match(struct io_kiocb *req, struct io_cancel_data *cd);
+bool io_match_task_safe(struct io_kiocb *head, struct io_uring_task *tctx,
+ bool cancel_all);
+
+bool io_cancel_remove_all(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_uring_task *tctx,
+ struct hlist_head *list, bool cancel_all,
+ bool (*cancel)(struct io_kiocb *));
+int io_cancel_remove(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_cancel_data *cd,
+ unsigned int issue_flags, struct hlist_head *list,
+ bool (*cancel)(struct io_kiocb *));
+__cold bool io_uring_try_cancel_requests(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
+ struct io_uring_task *tctx,
+ bool cancel_all, bool is_sqpoll_thread);
+__cold void io_uring_cancel_generic(bool cancel_all, struct io_sq_data *sqd);
+__cold bool io_cancel_ctx_cb(struct io_wq_work *work, void *data);
+
+static inline bool io_cancel_match_sequence(struct io_kiocb *req, int sequence)
+{
+ if (req->cancel_seq_set && sequence == req->work.cancel_seq)
+ return true;
+
+ req->cancel_seq_set = true;
+ req->work.cancel_seq = sequence;
+ return false;
+}
+
+#endif