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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /io_uring/cancel.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/cancel.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | io_uring/cancel.h | 49 |
1 files changed, 49 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/cancel.h b/io_uring/cancel.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1b201a094 --- /dev/null +++ b/io_uring/cancel.h @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#ifndef IORING_CANCEL_H +#define IORING_CANCEL_H + +#include <linux/io_uring_types.h> + +struct io_cancel_data { + struct io_ring_ctx *ctx; + u64 data; + struct file *file; + u8 opcode; + u32 flags; + int seq; +}; + +int io_async_cancel_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe); +int io_async_cancel(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags); + +int io_try_cancel(struct io_uring_task *tctx, struct io_cancel_data *cd, + unsigned int issue_flags); + +int io_sync_cancel(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *arg); +bool io_cancel_req_match(struct io_kiocb *req, struct io_cancel_data *cd); +bool io_match_task_safe(struct io_kiocb *head, struct io_uring_task *tctx, + bool cancel_all); + +bool io_cancel_remove_all(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_uring_task *tctx, + struct hlist_head *list, bool cancel_all, + bool (*cancel)(struct io_kiocb *)); +int io_cancel_remove(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_cancel_data *cd, + unsigned int issue_flags, struct hlist_head *list, + bool (*cancel)(struct io_kiocb *)); +__cold bool io_uring_try_cancel_requests(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, + struct io_uring_task *tctx, + bool cancel_all, bool is_sqpoll_thread); +__cold void io_uring_cancel_generic(bool cancel_all, struct io_sq_data *sqd); +__cold bool io_cancel_ctx_cb(struct io_wq_work *work, void *data); + +static inline bool io_cancel_match_sequence(struct io_kiocb *req, int sequence) +{ + if (req->cancel_seq_set && sequence == req->work.cancel_seq) + return true; + + req->cancel_seq_set = true; + req->work.cancel_seq = sequence; + return false; +} + +#endif |
