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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /io_uring/cancel.h
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/cancel.h')
-rw-r--r--io_uring/cancel.h49
1 files changed, 49 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/cancel.h b/io_uring/cancel.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1b201a094
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/cancel.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#ifndef IORING_CANCEL_H
+#define IORING_CANCEL_H
+
+#include <linux/io_uring_types.h>
+
+struct io_cancel_data {
+ struct io_ring_ctx *ctx;
+ u64 data;
+ struct file *file;
+ u8 opcode;
+ u32 flags;
+ int seq;
+};
+
+int io_async_cancel_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_async_cancel(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+
+int io_try_cancel(struct io_uring_task *tctx, struct io_cancel_data *cd,
+ unsigned int issue_flags);
+
+int io_sync_cancel(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *arg);
+bool io_cancel_req_match(struct io_kiocb *req, struct io_cancel_data *cd);
+bool io_match_task_safe(struct io_kiocb *head, struct io_uring_task *tctx,
+ bool cancel_all);
+
+bool io_cancel_remove_all(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_uring_task *tctx,
+ struct hlist_head *list, bool cancel_all,
+ bool (*cancel)(struct io_kiocb *));
+int io_cancel_remove(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_cancel_data *cd,
+ unsigned int issue_flags, struct hlist_head *list,
+ bool (*cancel)(struct io_kiocb *));
+__cold bool io_uring_try_cancel_requests(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
+ struct io_uring_task *tctx,
+ bool cancel_all, bool is_sqpoll_thread);
+__cold void io_uring_cancel_generic(bool cancel_all, struct io_sq_data *sqd);
+__cold bool io_cancel_ctx_cb(struct io_wq_work *work, void *data);
+
+static inline bool io_cancel_match_sequence(struct io_kiocb *req, int sequence)
+{
+ if (req->cancel_seq_set && sequence == req->work.cancel_seq)
+ return true;
+
+ req->cancel_seq_set = true;
+ req->work.cancel_seq = sequence;
+ return false;
+}
+
+#endif