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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /io_uring/cancel.h | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/cancel.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | io_uring/cancel.h | 49 |
1 files changed, 49 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/cancel.h b/io_uring/cancel.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1b201a094 --- /dev/null +++ b/io_uring/cancel.h @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#ifndef IORING_CANCEL_H +#define IORING_CANCEL_H + +#include <linux/io_uring_types.h> + +struct io_cancel_data { + struct io_ring_ctx *ctx; + u64 data; + struct file *file; + u8 opcode; + u32 flags; + int seq; +}; + +int io_async_cancel_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe); +int io_async_cancel(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags); + +int io_try_cancel(struct io_uring_task *tctx, struct io_cancel_data *cd, + unsigned int issue_flags); + +int io_sync_cancel(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *arg); +bool io_cancel_req_match(struct io_kiocb *req, struct io_cancel_data *cd); +bool io_match_task_safe(struct io_kiocb *head, struct io_uring_task *tctx, + bool cancel_all); + +bool io_cancel_remove_all(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_uring_task *tctx, + struct hlist_head *list, bool cancel_all, + bool (*cancel)(struct io_kiocb *)); +int io_cancel_remove(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_cancel_data *cd, + unsigned int issue_flags, struct hlist_head *list, + bool (*cancel)(struct io_kiocb *)); +__cold bool io_uring_try_cancel_requests(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, + struct io_uring_task *tctx, + bool cancel_all, bool is_sqpoll_thread); +__cold void io_uring_cancel_generic(bool cancel_all, struct io_sq_data *sqd); +__cold bool io_cancel_ctx_cb(struct io_wq_work *work, void *data); + +static inline bool io_cancel_match_sequence(struct io_kiocb *req, int sequence) +{ + if (req->cancel_seq_set && sequence == req->work.cancel_seq) + return true; + + req->cancel_seq_set = true; + req->work.cancel_seq = sequence; + return false; +} + +#endif |
