staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 28 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/io_uring/bpf-ops.h b/io_uring/bpf-ops.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0b6d78949
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/bpf-ops.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#ifndef IOU_BPF_OPS_H
+#define IOU_BPF_OPS_H
+
+#include <linux/io_uring_types.h>
+
+enum {
+	IOU_REGION_MEM,
+	IOU_REGION_CQ,
+	IOU_REGION_SQ,
+};
+
+struct io_uring_bpf_ops {
+	int (*loop_step)(struct iou_ctx *, struct iou_loop_params *lp);
+
+	__u32 ring_fd;
+	void *priv;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING_BPF_OPS
+void io_unregister_bpf_ops(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx);
+#else
+static inline void io_unregister_bpf_ops(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* IOU_BPF_OPS_H */