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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /io_uring/alloc_cache.h
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/alloc_cache.h')
-rw-r--r--io_uring/alloc_cache.h70
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/alloc_cache.h b/io_uring/alloc_cache.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..962b6e2d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/alloc_cache.h
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef IOU_ALLOC_CACHE_H
+#define IOU_ALLOC_CACHE_H
+
+#include <linux/io_uring_types.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+
+/*
+ * Don't allow the cache to grow beyond this size.
+ */
+#define IO_ALLOC_CACHE_MAX 128
+
+void io_alloc_cache_free(struct io_alloc_cache *cache,
+ void (*free)(const void *));
+bool io_alloc_cache_init(struct io_alloc_cache *cache,
+ unsigned max_nr, unsigned int size,
+ unsigned int init_bytes);
+
+void *io_cache_alloc_new(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, gfp_t gfp);
+
+static inline bool io_alloc_cache_put(struct io_alloc_cache *cache,
+ void *entry)
+{
+ if (cache->nr_cached < cache->max_cached) {
+ if (!kasan_mempool_poison_object(entry))
+ return false;
+ cache->entries[cache->nr_cached++] = entry;
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline void *io_alloc_cache_get(struct io_alloc_cache *cache)
+{
+ if (cache->nr_cached) {
+ void *entry = cache->entries[--cache->nr_cached];
+
+ /*
+ * If KASAN is enabled, always clear the initial bytes that
+ * must be zeroed post alloc, in case any of them overlap
+ * with KASAN storage.
+ */
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN)
+ kasan_mempool_unpoison_object(entry, cache->elem_size);
+ if (cache->init_clear)
+ memset(entry, 0, cache->init_clear);
+#endif
+ return entry;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline void *io_cache_alloc(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ void *obj;
+
+ obj = io_alloc_cache_get(cache);
+ if (obj)
+ return obj;
+ return io_cache_alloc_new(cache, gfp);
+}
+
+static inline void io_cache_free(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, void *obj)
+{
+ if (!io_alloc_cache_put(cache, obj))
+ kvfree(obj);
+}
+
+#endif