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| author | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2026-10-01 14:52:55 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> | 2026-10-01 18:39:27 +0200 |
| commit | 33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4 (patch) | |
| tree | 543be8029ab3d8a3a63994ae23385a053ed30029 /io_uring/alloc_cache.h | |
| download | linux-stable-33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4.tar.gz linux-stable-33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4.zip | |
selftests/bpf: Test packet range of pointers sharing an idgrafted
Add tests where two packet pointers share an id and tightening one
pointer's umax from its var_off would put it less than their constant
distance from the other's umax: with an index & 0x38 capped at 50, the
base pointer keeps umax 50, so the pointer 8 bytes further on must keep
umax 58, even though its known bits allow at most 56.
These refused a valid program or accepted an out-of-bounds access before
the fix:
- check the advanced copy, load through the base: valid, was refused;
- check the base, load the byte at base + 1 through a copy advanced by
8: was accepted;
- check base + 4, load 4 bytes at base + 2 through base + 8: reads two
bytes past the checked range, was accepted;
- the same as the second with data_meta pointers checked against data:
was accepted.
These pass with and without the fix and cover nearby paths:
- subtract an unknown scalar from a checked pointer and load below it
(the range is kept across a new id);
- reach a load through two paths whose checks cover 8 and 7 bytes after
the loaded pointer; the second path must not be pruned by the first;
- spill a copy of a pointer, check the pointer, fill the copy and load
one byte past the checked range: the load is refused, and the copy
has the range of the check.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20261001145255.855630-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/alloc_cache.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | io_uring/alloc_cache.h | 70 |
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/alloc_cache.h b/io_uring/alloc_cache.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..962b6e2d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/io_uring/alloc_cache.h @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef IOU_ALLOC_CACHE_H +#define IOU_ALLOC_CACHE_H + +#include <linux/io_uring_types.h> +#include <linux/kasan.h> + +/* + * Don't allow the cache to grow beyond this size. + */ +#define IO_ALLOC_CACHE_MAX 128 + +void io_alloc_cache_free(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, + void (*free)(const void *)); +bool io_alloc_cache_init(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, + unsigned max_nr, unsigned int size, + unsigned int init_bytes); + +void *io_cache_alloc_new(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, gfp_t gfp); + +static inline bool io_alloc_cache_put(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, + void *entry) +{ + if (cache->nr_cached < cache->max_cached) { + if (!kasan_mempool_poison_object(entry)) + return false; + cache->entries[cache->nr_cached++] = entry; + return true; + } + return false; +} + +static inline void *io_alloc_cache_get(struct io_alloc_cache *cache) +{ + if (cache->nr_cached) { + void *entry = cache->entries[--cache->nr_cached]; + + /* + * If KASAN is enabled, always clear the initial bytes that + * must be zeroed post alloc, in case any of them overlap + * with KASAN storage. + */ +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) + kasan_mempool_unpoison_object(entry, cache->elem_size); + if (cache->init_clear) + memset(entry, 0, cache->init_clear); +#endif + return entry; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static inline void *io_cache_alloc(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, gfp_t gfp) +{ + void *obj; + + obj = io_alloc_cache_get(cache); + if (obj) + return obj; + return io_cache_alloc_new(cache, gfp); +} + +static inline void io_cache_free(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, void *obj) +{ + if (!io_alloc_cache_put(cache, obj)) + kvfree(obj); +} + +#endif |
