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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /io_uring/alloc_cache.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/alloc_cache.c')
-rw-r--r--io_uring/alloc_cache.c44
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/alloc_cache.c b/io_uring/alloc_cache.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..58423888b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/alloc_cache.c
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include "alloc_cache.h"
+
+void io_alloc_cache_free(struct io_alloc_cache *cache,
+ void (*free)(const void *))
+{
+ void *entry;
+
+ if (!cache->entries)
+ return;
+
+ while ((entry = io_alloc_cache_get(cache)) != NULL)
+ free(entry);
+
+ kvfree(cache->entries);
+ cache->entries = NULL;
+}
+
+/* returns false if the cache was initialized properly */
+bool io_alloc_cache_init(struct io_alloc_cache *cache,
+ unsigned max_nr, unsigned int size,
+ unsigned int init_bytes)
+{
+ cache->entries = kvmalloc_array(max_nr, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cache->entries)
+ return true;
+
+ cache->nr_cached = 0;
+ cache->max_cached = max_nr;
+ cache->elem_size = size;
+ cache->init_clear = init_bytes;
+ return false;
+}
+
+void *io_cache_alloc_new(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ void *obj;
+
+ obj = kmalloc(cache->elem_size, gfp);
+ if (obj && cache->init_clear)
+ memset(obj, 0, cache->init_clear);
+ return obj;
+}