staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 108 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/io_uring/advise.c b/io_uring/advise.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0073f74e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/advise.c
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
+
+#include <uapi/linux/fadvise.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/io_uring.h>
+
+#include "io_uring.h"
+#include "advise.h"
+
+struct io_fadvise {
+	struct file			*file;
+	u64				offset;
+	u64				len;
+	u32				advice;
+};
+
+struct io_madvise {
+	struct file			*file;
+	u64				addr;
+	u64				len;
+	u32				advice;
+};
+
+int io_madvise_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe)
+{
+#if defined(CONFIG_ADVISE_SYSCALLS) && defined(CONFIG_MMU)
+	struct io_madvise *ma = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_madvise);
+
+	if (sqe->buf_index || sqe->splice_fd_in)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ma->addr = READ_ONCE(sqe->addr);
+	ma->len = READ_ONCE(sqe->off);
+	if (!ma->len)
+		ma->len = READ_ONCE(sqe->len);
+	ma->advice = READ_ONCE(sqe->fadvise_advice);
+	req->flags |= REQ_F_FORCE_ASYNC;
+	return 0;
+#else
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+#endif
+}
+
+int io_madvise(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
+{
+#if defined(CONFIG_ADVISE_SYSCALLS) && defined(CONFIG_MMU)
+	struct io_madvise *ma = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_madvise);
+	int ret;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(issue_flags & IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK);
+
+	ret = do_madvise(current->mm, ma->addr, ma->len, ma->advice);
+	io_req_set_res(req, ret, 0);
+	return IOU_COMPLETE;
+#else
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+#endif
+}
+
+static bool io_fadvise_force_async(struct io_fadvise *fa)
+{
+	switch (fa->advice) {
+	case POSIX_FADV_NORMAL:
+	case POSIX_FADV_RANDOM:
+	case POSIX_FADV_SEQUENTIAL:
+		return false;
+	default:
+		return true;
+	}
+}
+
+int io_fadvise_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe)
+{
+	struct io_fadvise *fa = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_fadvise);
+
+	if (sqe->buf_index || sqe->splice_fd_in)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	fa->offset = READ_ONCE(sqe->off);
+	fa->len = READ_ONCE(sqe->addr);
+	if (!fa->len)
+		fa->len = READ_ONCE(sqe->len);
+	fa->advice = READ_ONCE(sqe->fadvise_advice);
+	if (io_fadvise_force_async(fa))
+		req->flags |= REQ_F_FORCE_ASYNC;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int io_fadvise(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
+{
+	struct io_fadvise *fa = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_fadvise);
+	int ret;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(issue_flags & IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK && io_fadvise_force_async(fa));
+
+	ret = vfs_fadvise(req->file, fa->offset, fa->len, fa->advice);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		req_set_fail(req);
+	io_req_set_res(req, ret, 0);
+	return IOU_COMPLETE;
+}