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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/xen/page.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/xen/page.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/xen/page.h | 48 |
1 files changed, 48 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/xen/page.h b/include/xen/page.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..285677b42 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/xen/page.h @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _XEN_PAGE_H +#define _XEN_PAGE_H + +#include <asm/page.h> + +/* The hypercall interface supports only 4KB page */ +#define XEN_PAGE_SHIFT 12 +#define XEN_PAGE_SIZE (_AC(1, UL) << XEN_PAGE_SHIFT) +#define XEN_PAGE_MASK (~(XEN_PAGE_SIZE-1)) +#define xen_offset_in_page(p) ((unsigned long)(p) & ~XEN_PAGE_MASK) + +/* + * We assume that PAGE_SIZE is a multiple of XEN_PAGE_SIZE + * XXX: Add a BUILD_BUG_ON? + */ + +#define xen_pfn_to_page(xen_pfn) \ + (pfn_to_page((unsigned long)(xen_pfn) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - XEN_PAGE_SHIFT))) +#define page_to_xen_pfn(page) \ + ((page_to_pfn(page)) << (PAGE_SHIFT - XEN_PAGE_SHIFT)) + +#define XEN_PFN_PER_PAGE (PAGE_SIZE / XEN_PAGE_SIZE) + +#define XEN_PFN_DOWN(x) ((x) >> XEN_PAGE_SHIFT) +#define XEN_PFN_UP(x) (((x) + XEN_PAGE_SIZE-1) >> XEN_PAGE_SHIFT) + +#include <asm/xen/page.h> + +/* Return the GFN associated to the first 4KB of the page */ +static inline unsigned long xen_page_to_gfn(struct page *page) +{ + return pfn_to_gfn(page_to_xen_pfn(page)); +} + +struct xen_memory_region { + unsigned long start_pfn; + unsigned long n_pfns; +}; + +#define XEN_EXTRA_MEM_MAX_REGIONS 128 /* == E820_MAX_ENTRIES_ZEROPAGE */ + +extern __initdata +struct xen_memory_region xen_extra_mem[XEN_EXTRA_MEM_MAX_REGIONS]; + +extern unsigned long xen_released_pages; + +#endif /* _XEN_PAGE_H */ |
