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| author | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2026-10-01 14:52:55 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> | 2026-10-01 18:39:27 +0200 |
| commit | 33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4 (patch) | |
| tree | 543be8029ab3d8a3a63994ae23385a053ed30029 /include/xen/interface/xenpmu.h | |
| download | linux-stable-33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4.tar.gz linux-stable-33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4.zip | |
selftests/bpf: Test packet range of pointers sharing an idgrafted
Add tests where two packet pointers share an id and tightening one
pointer's umax from its var_off would put it less than their constant
distance from the other's umax: with an index & 0x38 capped at 50, the
base pointer keeps umax 50, so the pointer 8 bytes further on must keep
umax 58, even though its known bits allow at most 56.
These refused a valid program or accepted an out-of-bounds access before
the fix:
- check the advanced copy, load through the base: valid, was refused;
- check the base, load the byte at base + 1 through a copy advanced by
8: was accepted;
- check base + 4, load 4 bytes at base + 2 through base + 8: reads two
bytes past the checked range, was accepted;
- the same as the second with data_meta pointers checked against data:
was accepted.
These pass with and without the fix and cover nearby paths:
- subtract an unknown scalar from a checked pointer and load below it
(the range is kept across a new id);
- reach a load through two paths whose checks cover 8 and 7 bytes after
the loaded pointer; the second path must not be pruned by the first;
- spill a copy of a pointer, check the pointer, fill the copy and load
one byte past the checked range: the load is refused, and the copy
has the range of the check.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20261001145255.855630-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/xen/interface/xenpmu.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/xen/interface/xenpmu.h | 95 |
1 files changed, 95 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/xen/interface/xenpmu.h b/include/xen/interface/xenpmu.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e2ee73d91 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/xen/interface/xenpmu.h @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT */ +#ifndef __XEN_PUBLIC_XENPMU_H__ +#define __XEN_PUBLIC_XENPMU_H__ + +#include "xen.h" + +#define XENPMU_VER_MAJ 0 +#define XENPMU_VER_MIN 1 + +/* + * ` enum neg_errnoval + * ` HYPERVISOR_xenpmu_op(enum xenpmu_op cmd, struct xenpmu_params *args); + * + * @cmd == XENPMU_* (PMU operation) + * @args == struct xenpmu_params + */ +/* ` enum xenpmu_op { */ +#define XENPMU_mode_get 0 /* Also used for getting PMU version */ +#define XENPMU_mode_set 1 +#define XENPMU_feature_get 2 +#define XENPMU_feature_set 3 +#define XENPMU_init 4 +#define XENPMU_finish 5 +#define XENPMU_lvtpc_set 6 +#define XENPMU_flush 7 + +/* ` } */ + +/* Parameters structure for HYPERVISOR_xenpmu_op call */ +struct xen_pmu_params { + /* IN/OUT parameters */ + struct { + uint32_t maj; + uint32_t min; + } version; + uint64_t val; + + /* IN parameters */ + uint32_t vcpu; + uint32_t pad; +}; + +/* PMU modes: + * - XENPMU_MODE_OFF: No PMU virtualization + * - XENPMU_MODE_SELF: Guests can profile themselves + * - XENPMU_MODE_HV: Guests can profile themselves, dom0 profiles + * itself and Xen + * - XENPMU_MODE_ALL: Only dom0 has access to VPMU and it profiles + * everyone: itself, the hypervisor and the guests. + */ +#define XENPMU_MODE_OFF 0 +#define XENPMU_MODE_SELF (1<<0) +#define XENPMU_MODE_HV (1<<1) +#define XENPMU_MODE_ALL (1<<2) + +/* + * PMU features: + * - XENPMU_FEATURE_INTEL_BTS: Intel BTS support (ignored on AMD) + */ +#define XENPMU_FEATURE_INTEL_BTS 1 + +/* + * Shared PMU data between hypervisor and PV(H) domains. + * + * The hypervisor fills out this structure during PMU interrupt and sends an + * interrupt to appropriate VCPU. + * Architecture-independent fields of xen_pmu_data are WO for the hypervisor + * and RO for the guest but some fields in xen_pmu_arch can be writable + * by both the hypervisor and the guest (see arch-$arch/pmu.h). + */ +struct xen_pmu_data { + /* Interrupted VCPU */ + uint32_t vcpu_id; + + /* + * Physical processor on which the interrupt occurred. On non-privileged + * guests set to vcpu_id; + */ + uint32_t pcpu_id; + + /* + * Domain that was interrupted. On non-privileged guests set to + * DOMID_SELF. + * On privileged guests can be DOMID_SELF, DOMID_XEN, or, when in + * XENPMU_MODE_ALL mode, domain ID of another domain. + */ + domid_t domain_id; + + uint8_t pad[6]; + + /* Architecture-specific information */ + struct xen_pmu_arch pmu; +}; + +#endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_XENPMU_H__ */ |
