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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/xen/interface/nmi.h
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/xen/interface/nmi.h')
-rw-r--r--include/xen/interface/nmi.h52
1 files changed, 52 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/xen/interface/nmi.h b/include/xen/interface/nmi.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b665fdbef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/xen/interface/nmi.h
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT */
+/******************************************************************************
+ * nmi.h
+ *
+ * NMI callback registration and reason codes.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2005, Keir Fraser <keir@xensource.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef __XEN_PUBLIC_NMI_H__
+#define __XEN_PUBLIC_NMI_H__
+
+#include <xen/interface/xen.h>
+
+/*
+ * NMI reason codes:
+ * Currently these are x86-specific, stored in arch_shared_info.nmi_reason.
+ */
+ /* I/O-check error reported via ISA port 0x61, bit 6. */
+#define _XEN_NMIREASON_io_error 0
+#define XEN_NMIREASON_io_error (1UL << _XEN_NMIREASON_io_error)
+ /* PCI SERR reported via ISA port 0x61, bit 7. */
+#define _XEN_NMIREASON_pci_serr 1
+#define XEN_NMIREASON_pci_serr (1UL << _XEN_NMIREASON_pci_serr)
+ /* Unknown hardware-generated NMI. */
+#define _XEN_NMIREASON_unknown 2
+#define XEN_NMIREASON_unknown (1UL << _XEN_NMIREASON_unknown)
+
+/*
+ * long nmi_op(unsigned int cmd, void *arg)
+ * NB. All ops return zero on success, else a negative error code.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Register NMI callback for this (calling) VCPU. Currently this only makes
+ * sense for domain 0, vcpu 0. All other callers will be returned EINVAL.
+ * arg == pointer to xennmi_callback structure.
+ */
+#define XENNMI_register_callback 0
+struct xennmi_callback {
+ unsigned long handler_address;
+ unsigned long pad;
+};
+DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE_STRUCT(xennmi_callback);
+
+/*
+ * Deregister NMI callback for this (calling) VCPU.
+ * arg == NULL.
+ */
+#define XENNMI_unregister_callback 1
+
+#endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_NMI_H__ */