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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/xen/interface/features.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/xen/interface/features.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/xen/interface/features.h | 102 |
1 files changed, 102 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/xen/interface/features.h b/include/xen/interface/features.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..53f760378 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/xen/interface/features.h @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT */ +/****************************************************************************** + * features.h + * + * Feature flags, reported by XENVER_get_features. + * + * Copyright (c) 2006, Keir Fraser <keir@xensource.com> + */ + +#ifndef __XEN_PUBLIC_FEATURES_H__ +#define __XEN_PUBLIC_FEATURES_H__ + +/* + * If set, the guest does not need to write-protect its pagetables, and can + * update them via direct writes. + */ +#define XENFEAT_writable_page_tables 0 + +/* + * If set, the guest does not need to write-protect its segment descriptor + * tables, and can update them via direct writes. + */ +#define XENFEAT_writable_descriptor_tables 1 + +/* + * If set, translation between the guest's 'pseudo-physical' address space + * and the host's machine address space are handled by the hypervisor. In this + * mode the guest does not need to perform phys-to/from-machine translations + * when performing page table operations. + */ +#define XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap 2 + +/* If set, the guest is running in supervisor mode (e.g., x86 ring 0). */ +#define XENFEAT_supervisor_mode_kernel 3 + +/* + * If set, the guest does not need to allocate x86 PAE page directories + * below 4GB. This flag is usually implied by auto_translated_physmap. + */ +#define XENFEAT_pae_pgdir_above_4gb 4 + +/* x86: Does this Xen host support the MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD hypercall? */ +#define XENFEAT_mmu_pt_update_preserve_ad 5 + +/* x86: Does this Xen host support the MMU_{CLEAR,COPY}_PAGE hypercall? */ +#define XENFEAT_highmem_assist 6 + +/* + * If set, GNTTABOP_map_grant_ref honors flags to be placed into guest kernel + * available pte bits. + */ +#define XENFEAT_gnttab_map_avail_bits 7 + +/* x86: Does this Xen host support the HVM callback vector type? */ +#define XENFEAT_hvm_callback_vector 8 + +/* x86: pvclock algorithm is safe to use on HVM */ +#define XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock 9 + +/* x86: pirq can be used by HVM guests */ +#define XENFEAT_hvm_pirqs 10 + +/* operation as Dom0 is supported */ +#define XENFEAT_dom0 11 + +/* Xen also maps grant references at pfn = mfn. + * This feature flag is deprecated and should not be used. +#define XENFEAT_grant_map_identity 12 + */ + +/* Guest can use XENMEMF_vnode to specify virtual node for memory op. */ +#define XENFEAT_memory_op_vnode_supported 13 + +/* arm: Hypervisor supports ARM SMC calling convention. */ +#define XENFEAT_ARM_SMCCC_supported 14 + +/* + * x86/PVH: If set, ACPI RSDP can be placed at any address. Otherwise RSDP + * must be located in lower 1MB, as required by ACPI Specification for IA-PC + * systems. + * This feature flag is only consulted if XEN_ELFNOTE_GUEST_OS contains + * the "linux" string. + */ +#define XENFEAT_linux_rsdp_unrestricted 15 + +/* + * A direct-mapped (or 1:1 mapped) domain is a domain for which its + * local pages have gfn == mfn. If a domain is direct-mapped, + * XENFEAT_direct_mapped is set; otherwise XENFEAT_not_direct_mapped + * is set. + * + * If neither flag is set (e.g. older Xen releases) the assumptions are: + * - not auto_translated domains (x86 only) are always direct-mapped + * - on x86, auto_translated domains are not direct-mapped + * - on ARM, Dom0 is direct-mapped, DomUs are not + */ +#define XENFEAT_not_direct_mapped 16 +#define XENFEAT_direct_mapped 17 + +#define XENFEAT_NR_SUBMAPS 1 + +#endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_FEATURES_H__ */ |
