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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/xen/interface/callback.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/xen/interface/callback.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/xen/interface/callback.h | 85 |
1 files changed, 85 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/xen/interface/callback.h b/include/xen/interface/callback.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c67822a25 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/xen/interface/callback.h @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT */ +/****************************************************************************** + * callback.h + * + * Register guest OS callbacks with Xen. + * + * Copyright (c) 2006, Ian Campbell + */ + +#ifndef __XEN_PUBLIC_CALLBACK_H__ +#define __XEN_PUBLIC_CALLBACK_H__ + +#include <xen/interface/xen.h> + +/* + * Prototype for this hypercall is: + * long callback_op(int cmd, void *extra_args) + * @cmd == CALLBACKOP_??? (callback operation). + * @extra_args == Operation-specific extra arguments (NULL if none). + */ + +/* x86: Callback for event delivery. */ +#define CALLBACKTYPE_event 0 + +/* x86: Failsafe callback when guest state cannot be restored by Xen. */ +#define CALLBACKTYPE_failsafe 1 + +/* x86/64 hypervisor: Syscall by 64-bit guest app ('64-on-64-on-64'). */ +#define CALLBACKTYPE_syscall 2 + +/* + * x86/32 hypervisor: Only available on x86/32 when supervisor_mode_kernel + * feature is enabled. Do not use this callback type in new code. + */ +#define CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter_deprecated 3 + +/* x86: Callback for NMI delivery. */ +#define CALLBACKTYPE_nmi 4 + +/* + * x86: sysenter is only available as follows: + * - 32-bit hypervisor: with the supervisor_mode_kernel feature enabled + * - 64-bit hypervisor: 32-bit guest applications on Intel CPUs + * ('32-on-32-on-64', '32-on-64-on-64') + * [nb. also 64-bit guest applications on Intel CPUs + * ('64-on-64-on-64'), but syscall is preferred] + */ +#define CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter 5 + +/* + * x86/64 hypervisor: Syscall by 32-bit guest app on AMD CPUs + * ('32-on-32-on-64', '32-on-64-on-64') + */ +#define CALLBACKTYPE_syscall32 7 + +/* + * Disable event deliver during callback? This flag is ignored for event and + * NMI callbacks: event delivery is unconditionally disabled. + */ +#define _CALLBACKF_mask_events 0 +#define CALLBACKF_mask_events (1U << _CALLBACKF_mask_events) + +/* + * Register a callback. + */ +#define CALLBACKOP_register 0 +struct callback_register { + uint16_t type; + uint16_t flags; + xen_callback_t address; +}; + +/* + * Unregister a callback. + * + * Not all callbacks can be unregistered. -EINVAL will be returned if + * you attempt to unregister such a callback. + */ +#define CALLBACKOP_unregister 1 +struct callback_unregister { + uint16_t type; + uint16_t _unused; +}; + +#endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_CALLBACK_H__ */ |
