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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/xen/interface/callback.h
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/xen/interface/callback.h')
-rw-r--r--include/xen/interface/callback.h85
1 files changed, 85 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/xen/interface/callback.h b/include/xen/interface/callback.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c67822a25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/xen/interface/callback.h
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT */
+/******************************************************************************
+ * callback.h
+ *
+ * Register guest OS callbacks with Xen.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2006, Ian Campbell
+ */
+
+#ifndef __XEN_PUBLIC_CALLBACK_H__
+#define __XEN_PUBLIC_CALLBACK_H__
+
+#include <xen/interface/xen.h>
+
+/*
+ * Prototype for this hypercall is:
+ * long callback_op(int cmd, void *extra_args)
+ * @cmd == CALLBACKOP_??? (callback operation).
+ * @extra_args == Operation-specific extra arguments (NULL if none).
+ */
+
+/* x86: Callback for event delivery. */
+#define CALLBACKTYPE_event 0
+
+/* x86: Failsafe callback when guest state cannot be restored by Xen. */
+#define CALLBACKTYPE_failsafe 1
+
+/* x86/64 hypervisor: Syscall by 64-bit guest app ('64-on-64-on-64'). */
+#define CALLBACKTYPE_syscall 2
+
+/*
+ * x86/32 hypervisor: Only available on x86/32 when supervisor_mode_kernel
+ * feature is enabled. Do not use this callback type in new code.
+ */
+#define CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter_deprecated 3
+
+/* x86: Callback for NMI delivery. */
+#define CALLBACKTYPE_nmi 4
+
+/*
+ * x86: sysenter is only available as follows:
+ * - 32-bit hypervisor: with the supervisor_mode_kernel feature enabled
+ * - 64-bit hypervisor: 32-bit guest applications on Intel CPUs
+ * ('32-on-32-on-64', '32-on-64-on-64')
+ * [nb. also 64-bit guest applications on Intel CPUs
+ * ('64-on-64-on-64'), but syscall is preferred]
+ */
+#define CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter 5
+
+/*
+ * x86/64 hypervisor: Syscall by 32-bit guest app on AMD CPUs
+ * ('32-on-32-on-64', '32-on-64-on-64')
+ */
+#define CALLBACKTYPE_syscall32 7
+
+/*
+ * Disable event deliver during callback? This flag is ignored for event and
+ * NMI callbacks: event delivery is unconditionally disabled.
+ */
+#define _CALLBACKF_mask_events 0
+#define CALLBACKF_mask_events (1U << _CALLBACKF_mask_events)
+
+/*
+ * Register a callback.
+ */
+#define CALLBACKOP_register 0
+struct callback_register {
+ uint16_t type;
+ uint16_t flags;
+ xen_callback_t address;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Unregister a callback.
+ *
+ * Not all callbacks can be unregistered. -EINVAL will be returned if
+ * you attempt to unregister such a callback.
+ */
+#define CALLBACKOP_unregister 1
+struct callback_unregister {
+ uint16_t type;
+ uint16_t _unused;
+};
+
+#endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_CALLBACK_H__ */