staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 86 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/include/xen/arm/interface.h b/include/xen/arm/interface.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..61360b89d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/xen/arm/interface.h
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/******************************************************************************
+ * Guest OS interface to ARM Xen.
+ *
+ * Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>, Citrix, 2012
+ */
+
+#ifndef _ASM_ARM_XEN_INTERFACE_H
+#define _ASM_ARM_XEN_INTERFACE_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define uint64_aligned_t uint64_t __attribute__((aligned(8)))
+
+#define __DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE(name, type) \
+	typedef struct { union { type *p; uint64_aligned_t q; }; }  \
+        __guest_handle_ ## name
+
+#define DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE_STRUCT(name) \
+	__DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE(name, struct name)
+#define DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE(name) __DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE(name, name)
+#define GUEST_HANDLE(name)        __guest_handle_ ## name
+
+#define set_xen_guest_handle(hnd, val)			\
+	do {						\
+		if (sizeof(hnd) == 8)			\
+			*(uint64_t *)&(hnd) = 0;	\
+		(hnd).p = val;				\
+	} while (0)
+
+#define __HYPERVISOR_platform_op_raw __HYPERVISOR_platform_op
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
+/* Explicitly size integers that represent pfns in the interface with
+ * Xen so that we can have one ABI that works for 32 and 64 bit guests.
+ * Note that this means that the xen_pfn_t type may be capable of
+ * representing pfn's which the guest cannot represent in its own pfn
+ * type. However since pfn space is controlled by the guest this is
+ * fine since it simply wouldn't be able to create any sure pfns in
+ * the first place.
+ */
+typedef uint64_t xen_pfn_t;
+#define PRI_xen_pfn "llx"
+typedef uint64_t xen_ulong_t;
+#define PRI_xen_ulong "llx"
+typedef int64_t xen_long_t;
+#define PRI_xen_long "llx"
+/* Guest handles for primitive C types. */
+__DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE(uchar, unsigned char);
+__DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE(uint,  unsigned int);
+DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE(char);
+DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE(int);
+DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE(void);
+DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE(uint64_t);
+DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE(uint32_t);
+DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_pfn_t);
+DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_ulong_t);
+
+/* Maximum number of virtual CPUs in multi-processor guests. */
+#define MAX_VIRT_CPUS 1
+
+struct arch_vcpu_info { };
+struct arch_shared_info { };
+
+/* TODO: Move pvclock definitions some place arch independent */
+struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info {
+	u32   version;
+	u32   pad0;
+	u64   tsc_timestamp;
+	u64   system_time;
+	u32   tsc_to_system_mul;
+	s8    tsc_shift;
+	u8    flags;
+	u8    pad[2];
+} __attribute__((__packed__)); /* 32 bytes */
+
+/* It is OK to have a 12 bytes struct with no padding because it is packed */
+struct pvclock_wall_clock {
+	u32   version;
+	u32   sec;
+	u32   nsec;
+	u32   sec_hi;
+} __attribute__((__packed__));
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _ASM_ARM_XEN_INTERFACE_H */