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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/vdso/math64.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/vdso/math64.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/vdso/math64.h | 62 |
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/vdso/math64.h b/include/vdso/math64.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..22ae212f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/vdso/math64.h @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __VDSO_MATH64_H +#define __VDSO_MATH64_H + +static __always_inline u32 +__iter_div_u64_rem(u64 dividend, u32 divisor, u64 *remainder) +{ + u32 ret = 0; + + while (dividend >= divisor) { + /* The following asm() prevents the compiler from + optimising this loop into a modulo operation. */ + asm("" : "+rm"(dividend)); + + dividend -= divisor; + ret++; + } + + *remainder = dividend; + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128) && defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) + +#ifndef mul_u64_u32_add_u64_shr +static __always_inline u64 mul_u64_u32_add_u64_shr(u64 a, u32 mul, u64 b, unsigned int shift) +{ + return (u64)((((unsigned __int128)a * mul) + b) >> shift); +} +#endif /* mul_u64_u32_add_u64_shr */ + +#else + +#ifndef mul_u64_u32_add_u64_shr +#ifndef mul_u32_u32 +static inline u64 mul_u32_u32(u32 a, u32 b) +{ + return (u64)a * b; +} +#define mul_u32_u32 mul_u32_u32 +#endif +static __always_inline u64 mul_u64_u32_add_u64_shr(u64 a, u32 mul, u64 b, unsigned int shift) +{ + u32 ah = a >> 32, al = a; + bool ovf; + u64 ret; + + ovf = __builtin_add_overflow(mul_u32_u32(al, mul), b, &ret); + ret >>= shift; + if (ovf && shift) + ret += 1ULL << (64 - shift); + if (ah) + ret += mul_u32_u32(ah, mul) << (32 - shift); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* mul_u64_u32_add_u64_shr */ + +#endif + +#endif /* __VDSO_MATH64_H */ |
