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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/vdso/math64.h
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/vdso/math64.h')
-rw-r--r--include/vdso/math64.h62
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/vdso/math64.h b/include/vdso/math64.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..22ae212f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/vdso/math64.h
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __VDSO_MATH64_H
+#define __VDSO_MATH64_H
+
+static __always_inline u32
+__iter_div_u64_rem(u64 dividend, u32 divisor, u64 *remainder)
+{
+ u32 ret = 0;
+
+ while (dividend >= divisor) {
+ /* The following asm() prevents the compiler from
+ optimising this loop into a modulo operation. */
+ asm("" : "+rm"(dividend));
+
+ dividend -= divisor;
+ ret++;
+ }
+
+ *remainder = dividend;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128) && defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__)
+
+#ifndef mul_u64_u32_add_u64_shr
+static __always_inline u64 mul_u64_u32_add_u64_shr(u64 a, u32 mul, u64 b, unsigned int shift)
+{
+ return (u64)((((unsigned __int128)a * mul) + b) >> shift);
+}
+#endif /* mul_u64_u32_add_u64_shr */
+
+#else
+
+#ifndef mul_u64_u32_add_u64_shr
+#ifndef mul_u32_u32
+static inline u64 mul_u32_u32(u32 a, u32 b)
+{
+ return (u64)a * b;
+}
+#define mul_u32_u32 mul_u32_u32
+#endif
+static __always_inline u64 mul_u64_u32_add_u64_shr(u64 a, u32 mul, u64 b, unsigned int shift)
+{
+ u32 ah = a >> 32, al = a;
+ bool ovf;
+ u64 ret;
+
+ ovf = __builtin_add_overflow(mul_u32_u32(al, mul), b, &ret);
+ ret >>= shift;
+ if (ovf && shift)
+ ret += 1ULL << (64 - shift);
+ if (ah)
+ ret += mul_u32_u32(ah, mul) << (32 - shift);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* mul_u64_u32_add_u64_shr */
+
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __VDSO_MATH64_H */