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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/uapi/misc/ocxl.h
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/uapi/misc/ocxl.h')
-rw-r--r--include/uapi/misc/ocxl.h80
1 files changed, 80 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/uapi/misc/ocxl.h b/include/uapi/misc/ocxl.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6d29a60a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/uapi/misc/ocxl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note */
+/* Copyright 2017 IBM Corp. */
+#ifndef _UAPI_MISC_OCXL_H
+#define _UAPI_MISC_OCXL_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/ioctl.h>
+
+enum ocxl_event_type {
+ OCXL_AFU_EVENT_XSL_FAULT_ERROR = 0,
+};
+
+#define OCXL_KERNEL_EVENT_FLAG_LAST 0x0001 /* This is the last event pending */
+
+struct ocxl_kernel_event_header {
+ __u16 type;
+ __u16 flags;
+ __u32 reserved;
+};
+
+struct ocxl_kernel_event_xsl_fault_error {
+ __u64 addr;
+ __u64 dsisr;
+ __u64 count;
+ __u64 reserved;
+};
+
+struct ocxl_ioctl_attach {
+ __u64 amr;
+ __u64 reserved1;
+ __u64 reserved2;
+ __u64 reserved3;
+};
+
+struct ocxl_ioctl_metadata {
+ __u16 version; /* struct version, always backwards compatible */
+
+ /* Version 0 fields */
+ __u8 afu_version_major;
+ __u8 afu_version_minor;
+ __u32 pasid; /* PASID assigned to the current context */
+
+ __u64 pp_mmio_size; /* Per PASID MMIO size */
+ __u64 global_mmio_size;
+
+ /* End version 0 fields */
+
+ __u64 reserved[13]; /* Total of 16*u64 */
+};
+
+struct ocxl_ioctl_p9_wait {
+ __u16 thread_id; /* The thread ID required to wake this thread */
+ __u16 reserved1;
+ __u32 reserved2;
+ __u64 reserved3[3];
+};
+
+#define OCXL_IOCTL_FEATURES_FLAGS0_P9_WAIT 0x01
+struct ocxl_ioctl_features {
+ __u64 flags[4];
+};
+
+struct ocxl_ioctl_irq_fd {
+ __u64 irq_offset;
+ __s32 eventfd;
+ __u32 reserved;
+};
+
+/* ioctl numbers */
+#define OCXL_MAGIC 0xCA
+/* AFU devices */
+#define OCXL_IOCTL_ATTACH _IOW(OCXL_MAGIC, 0x10, struct ocxl_ioctl_attach)
+#define OCXL_IOCTL_IRQ_ALLOC _IOR(OCXL_MAGIC, 0x11, __u64)
+#define OCXL_IOCTL_IRQ_FREE _IOW(OCXL_MAGIC, 0x12, __u64)
+#define OCXL_IOCTL_IRQ_SET_FD _IOW(OCXL_MAGIC, 0x13, struct ocxl_ioctl_irq_fd)
+#define OCXL_IOCTL_GET_METADATA _IOR(OCXL_MAGIC, 0x14, struct ocxl_ioctl_metadata)
+#define OCXL_IOCTL_ENABLE_P9_WAIT _IOR(OCXL_MAGIC, 0x15, struct ocxl_ioctl_p9_wait)
+#define OCXL_IOCTL_GET_FEATURES _IOR(OCXL_MAGIC, 0x16, struct ocxl_ioctl_features)
+
+#endif /* _UAPI_MISC_OCXL_H */