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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/uapi/misc/ocxl.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/uapi/misc/ocxl.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/uapi/misc/ocxl.h | 80 |
1 files changed, 80 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/uapi/misc/ocxl.h b/include/uapi/misc/ocxl.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6d29a60a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/uapi/misc/ocxl.h @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +/* Copyright 2017 IBM Corp. */ +#ifndef _UAPI_MISC_OCXL_H +#define _UAPI_MISC_OCXL_H + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/ioctl.h> + +enum ocxl_event_type { + OCXL_AFU_EVENT_XSL_FAULT_ERROR = 0, +}; + +#define OCXL_KERNEL_EVENT_FLAG_LAST 0x0001 /* This is the last event pending */ + +struct ocxl_kernel_event_header { + __u16 type; + __u16 flags; + __u32 reserved; +}; + +struct ocxl_kernel_event_xsl_fault_error { + __u64 addr; + __u64 dsisr; + __u64 count; + __u64 reserved; +}; + +struct ocxl_ioctl_attach { + __u64 amr; + __u64 reserved1; + __u64 reserved2; + __u64 reserved3; +}; + +struct ocxl_ioctl_metadata { + __u16 version; /* struct version, always backwards compatible */ + + /* Version 0 fields */ + __u8 afu_version_major; + __u8 afu_version_minor; + __u32 pasid; /* PASID assigned to the current context */ + + __u64 pp_mmio_size; /* Per PASID MMIO size */ + __u64 global_mmio_size; + + /* End version 0 fields */ + + __u64 reserved[13]; /* Total of 16*u64 */ +}; + +struct ocxl_ioctl_p9_wait { + __u16 thread_id; /* The thread ID required to wake this thread */ + __u16 reserved1; + __u32 reserved2; + __u64 reserved3[3]; +}; + +#define OCXL_IOCTL_FEATURES_FLAGS0_P9_WAIT 0x01 +struct ocxl_ioctl_features { + __u64 flags[4]; +}; + +struct ocxl_ioctl_irq_fd { + __u64 irq_offset; + __s32 eventfd; + __u32 reserved; +}; + +/* ioctl numbers */ +#define OCXL_MAGIC 0xCA +/* AFU devices */ +#define OCXL_IOCTL_ATTACH _IOW(OCXL_MAGIC, 0x10, struct ocxl_ioctl_attach) +#define OCXL_IOCTL_IRQ_ALLOC _IOR(OCXL_MAGIC, 0x11, __u64) +#define OCXL_IOCTL_IRQ_FREE _IOW(OCXL_MAGIC, 0x12, __u64) +#define OCXL_IOCTL_IRQ_SET_FD _IOW(OCXL_MAGIC, 0x13, struct ocxl_ioctl_irq_fd) +#define OCXL_IOCTL_GET_METADATA _IOR(OCXL_MAGIC, 0x14, struct ocxl_ioctl_metadata) +#define OCXL_IOCTL_ENABLE_P9_WAIT _IOR(OCXL_MAGIC, 0x15, struct ocxl_ioctl_p9_wait) +#define OCXL_IOCTL_GET_FEATURES _IOR(OCXL_MAGIC, 0x16, struct ocxl_ioctl_features) + +#endif /* _UAPI_MISC_OCXL_H */ |
