diff options
| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /include/uapi/fwctl/mlx5.h | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/uapi/fwctl/mlx5.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/uapi/fwctl/mlx5.h | 36 |
1 files changed, 36 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/uapi/fwctl/mlx5.h b/include/uapi/fwctl/mlx5.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..625819180 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/uapi/fwctl/mlx5.h @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2024-2025, NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES + * + * These are definitions for the command interface for mlx5 HW. mlx5 FW has a + * User Context mechanism which allows the FW to understand a security scope. + * FWCTL binds each FD to a FW user context and then places the User Context ID + * (UID) in each command header. The created User Context has a capability set + * that is appropriate for FWCTL's security model. + * + * Command formation should use a copy of the structs in mlx5_ifc.h following + * the Programmers Reference Manual. A open release is available here: + * + * https://network.nvidia.com/files/doc-2020/ethernet-adapters-programming-manual.pdf + * + * The device_type for this file is FWCTL_DEVICE_TYPE_MLX5. + */ +#ifndef _UAPI_FWCTL_MLX5_H +#define _UAPI_FWCTL_MLX5_H + +#include <linux/types.h> + +/** + * struct fwctl_info_mlx5 - ioctl(FWCTL_INFO) out_device_data + * @uid: The FW UID this FD is bound to. Each command header will force + * this value. + * @uctx_caps: The FW capabilities that are enabled for the uid. + * + * Return basic information about the FW interface available. + */ +struct fwctl_info_mlx5 { + __u32 uid; + __u32 uctx_caps; +}; + +#endif |
