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authorLiu Chao <liuc63@xiaopeng.com>2026-09-21 15:25:51 +0800
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-10-01 07:12:43 +0200
commit9062d50e75c24dc7911be05c9b1719b3b256af15 (patch)
tree09559f03fb76730b4f551425ce28e6e2b01db6db /include/uapi/asm-generic/bitsperlong.h
downloadlinux-stable-9062d50e75c24dc7911be05c9b1719b3b256af15.tar.gz
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usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate bRequest index in generic_{set,get}_cmdgrafted
generic_set_cmd() and generic_get_cmd() use the low nibble of ctrl->bRequest as an index into con->data[]: u8 cmd = (ctrl->bRequest & 0x0F); /* 0 .. 15 */ ... con->data[cmd] = value; /* OOB when cmd >= 5 */ struct usb_audio_control (include/linux/usb/audio.h) declares data as a 5-element array, so indices 5 through 15 write (or read) up to 44 bytes past the end of the array on the heap. A malicious USB host can craft a class-specific SET_CUR / GET_CUR request with an arbitrary bRequest value, triggering the out-of-bounds access from an IRQ completion handler with no further preconditions. Add an ARRAY_SIZE() guard to both functions. Fixes: c47d7b09891a ("USB: audio: add USB audio class definitions") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Weibin Liu <liuwb@xiaopeng.com> Signed-off-by: Liu Chao <liuc63@xiaopeng.com> Reviewed-by: Ivy Lopez <skunkolee@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921072551.3708191-1-liuc63@xiaopeng.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/uapi/asm-generic/bitsperlong.h')
-rw-r--r--include/uapi/asm-generic/bitsperlong.h31
1 files changed, 31 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/bitsperlong.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/bitsperlong.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fadb3f857
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/bitsperlong.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
+#ifndef _UAPI__ASM_GENERIC_BITS_PER_LONG
+#define _UAPI__ASM_GENERIC_BITS_PER_LONG
+
+#ifndef __BITS_PER_LONG
+/*
+ * In order to keep safe and avoid regression, only unify uapi
+ * bitsperlong.h for some archs which are using newer toolchains
+ * that have the definitions of __CHAR_BIT__ and __SIZEOF_LONG__.
+ * See the following link for more info:
+ * https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arch/b9624545-2c80-49a1-ac3c-39264a591f7b@app.fastmail.com/
+ */
+#if defined(__CHAR_BIT__) && defined(__SIZEOF_LONG__)
+#define __BITS_PER_LONG (__CHAR_BIT__ * __SIZEOF_LONG__)
+#else
+/*
+ * There seems to be no way of detecting this automatically from user
+ * space, so 64 bit architectures should override this in their
+ * bitsperlong.h. In particular, an architecture that supports
+ * both 32 and 64 bit user space must not rely on CONFIG_64BIT
+ * to decide it, but rather check a compiler provided macro.
+ */
+#define __BITS_PER_LONG 32
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __BITS_PER_LONG_LONG
+#define __BITS_PER_LONG_LONG 64
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _UAPI__ASM_GENERIC_BITS_PER_LONG */