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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/trace/syscall.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/trace/syscall.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/trace/syscall.h | 57 |
1 files changed, 57 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/trace/syscall.h b/include/trace/syscall.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0dd7f2b33 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/trace/syscall.h @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _TRACE_SYSCALL_H +#define _TRACE_SYSCALL_H + +#include <linux/tracepoint.h> +#include <linux/unistd.h> +#include <linux/trace_events.h> +#include <linux/thread_info.h> + +#include <asm/ptrace.h> + + +/* + * A syscall entry in the ftrace syscalls array. + * + * @name: name of the syscall + * @syscall_nr: number of the syscall + * @nb_args: number of parameters it takes + * @user_arg_is_str: set if the arg for @user_arg_size is a string + * @user_arg_size: holds @arg that has size of the user space to read + * @user_mask: mask of @args that will read user space + * @types: list of types as strings + * @args: list of args as strings (args[i] matches types[i]) + * @enter_fields: list of fields for syscall_enter trace event + * @enter_event: associated syscall_enter trace event + * @exit_event: associated syscall_exit trace event + */ +struct syscall_metadata { + const char *name; + int syscall_nr; + u8 nb_args:7; + u8 user_arg_is_str:1; + s8 user_arg_size; + short user_mask; + const char **types; + const char **args; + struct list_head enter_fields; + + struct trace_event_call *enter_event; + struct trace_event_call *exit_event; +}; + +#if defined(CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS) && defined(CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS) +static inline void syscall_tracepoint_update(struct task_struct *p) +{ + if (test_syscall_work(SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)) + set_task_syscall_work(p, SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT); + else + clear_task_syscall_work(p, SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT); +} +#else +static inline void syscall_tracepoint_update(struct task_struct *p) +{ +} +#endif + +#endif /* _TRACE_SYSCALL_H */ |
