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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/trace/events/siox.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/trace/events/siox.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/trace/events/siox.h | 66 |
1 files changed, 66 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/trace/events/siox.h b/include/trace/events/siox.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..68a43fc2c --- /dev/null +++ b/include/trace/events/siox.h @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +#undef TRACE_SYSTEM +#define TRACE_SYSTEM siox + +#if !defined(_TRACE_SIOX_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) +#define _TRACE_SIOX_H + +#include <linux/tracepoint.h> + +TRACE_EVENT(siox_set_data, + TP_PROTO(const struct siox_master *smaster, + const struct siox_device *sdevice, + unsigned int devno, size_t bufoffset), + TP_ARGS(smaster, sdevice, devno, bufoffset), + TP_STRUCT__entry( + __field(int, busno) + __field(unsigned int, devno) + __field(size_t, inbytes) + __dynamic_array(u8, buf, sdevice->inbytes) + ), + TP_fast_assign( + __entry->busno = smaster->busno; + __entry->devno = devno; + __entry->inbytes = sdevice->inbytes; + memcpy(__get_dynamic_array(buf), + smaster->buf + bufoffset, sdevice->inbytes); + ), + TP_printk("siox-%d-%u [%*phD]", + __entry->busno, + __entry->devno, + (int)__entry->inbytes, __get_dynamic_array(buf) + ) +); + +TRACE_EVENT(siox_get_data, + TP_PROTO(const struct siox_master *smaster, + const struct siox_device *sdevice, + unsigned int devno, u8 status_clean, + size_t bufoffset), + TP_ARGS(smaster, sdevice, devno, status_clean, bufoffset), + TP_STRUCT__entry( + __field(int, busno) + __field(unsigned int, devno) + __field(u8, status_clean) + __field(size_t, outbytes) + __dynamic_array(u8, buf, sdevice->outbytes) + ), + TP_fast_assign( + __entry->busno = smaster->busno; + __entry->devno = devno; + __entry->status_clean = status_clean; + __entry->outbytes = sdevice->outbytes; + memcpy(__get_dynamic_array(buf), + smaster->buf + bufoffset, sdevice->outbytes); + ), + TP_printk("siox-%d-%u (%02hhx) [%*phD]", + __entry->busno, + __entry->devno, + __entry->status_clean, + (int)__entry->outbytes, __get_dynamic_array(buf) + ) +); + +#endif /* if !defined(_TRACE_SIOX_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) */ + +/* This part must be outside protection */ +#include <trace/define_trace.h> |
