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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/trace/events/mmap.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/trace/events/mmap.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/trace/events/mmap.h | 69 |
1 files changed, 69 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/trace/events/mmap.h b/include/trace/events/mmap.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ee2843a5d --- /dev/null +++ b/include/trace/events/mmap.h @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#undef TRACE_SYSTEM +#define TRACE_SYSTEM mmap + +#if !defined(_TRACE_MMAP_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) +#define _TRACE_MMAP_H + +#include <linux/tracepoint.h> + +TRACE_EVENT(vm_unmapped_area, + + TP_PROTO(unsigned long addr, struct vm_unmapped_area_info *info), + + TP_ARGS(addr, info), + + TP_STRUCT__entry( + __field(unsigned long, addr) + __field(unsigned long, total_vm) + __field(unsigned long, flags) + __field(unsigned long, length) + __field(unsigned long, low_limit) + __field(unsigned long, high_limit) + __field(unsigned long, align_mask) + __field(unsigned long, align_offset) + ), + + TP_fast_assign( + __entry->addr = addr; + __entry->total_vm = current->mm->total_vm; + __entry->flags = info->flags; + __entry->length = info->length; + __entry->low_limit = info->low_limit; + __entry->high_limit = info->high_limit; + __entry->align_mask = info->align_mask; + __entry->align_offset = info->align_offset; + ), + + TP_printk("addr=0x%lx err=%ld total_vm=0x%lx flags=0x%lx len=0x%lx lo=0x%lx hi=0x%lx mask=0x%lx ofs=0x%lx", + IS_ERR_VALUE(__entry->addr) ? 0 : __entry->addr, + IS_ERR_VALUE(__entry->addr) ? __entry->addr : 0, + __entry->total_vm, __entry->flags, __entry->length, + __entry->low_limit, __entry->high_limit, __entry->align_mask, + __entry->align_offset) +); + +TRACE_EVENT(exit_mmap, + TP_PROTO(struct mm_struct *mm), + + TP_ARGS(mm), + + TP_STRUCT__entry( + __field(struct mm_struct *, mm) + __field(struct maple_tree *, mt) + ), + + TP_fast_assign( + __entry->mm = mm; + __entry->mt = &mm->mm_mt; + ), + + TP_printk("mt_mod %p, DESTROY", + __entry->mt + ) +); + +#endif + +/* This part must be outside protection */ +#include <trace/define_trace.h> |
