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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/trace/events/mctp.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/trace/events/mctp.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/trace/events/mctp.h | 78 |
1 files changed, 78 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/trace/events/mctp.h b/include/trace/events/mctp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..165cf25f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/trace/events/mctp.h @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#undef TRACE_SYSTEM +#define TRACE_SYSTEM mctp + +#if !defined(_TRACE_MCTP_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) +#define _TRACE_MCTP_H + +#include <linux/tracepoint.h> + +#ifndef __TRACE_MCTP_ENUMS +#define __TRACE_MCTP_ENUMS +enum { + MCTP_TRACE_KEY_TIMEOUT, + MCTP_TRACE_KEY_REPLIED, + MCTP_TRACE_KEY_INVALIDATED, + MCTP_TRACE_KEY_CLOSED, + MCTP_TRACE_KEY_DROPPED, +}; +#endif /* __TRACE_MCTP_ENUMS */ + +TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(MCTP_TRACE_KEY_TIMEOUT); +TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(MCTP_TRACE_KEY_REPLIED); +TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(MCTP_TRACE_KEY_INVALIDATED); +TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(MCTP_TRACE_KEY_CLOSED); +TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(MCTP_TRACE_KEY_DROPPED); + +TRACE_EVENT(mctp_key_acquire, + TP_PROTO(const struct mctp_sk_key *key), + TP_ARGS(key), + TP_STRUCT__entry( + __field(__u8, paddr) + __field(__u8, laddr) + __field(__u8, tag) + ), + TP_fast_assign( + __entry->paddr = key->peer_addr; + __entry->laddr = key->local_addr; + __entry->tag = key->tag; + ), + TP_printk("local %d, peer %d, tag %1x", + __entry->laddr, + __entry->paddr, + __entry->tag + ) +); + +TRACE_EVENT(mctp_key_release, + TP_PROTO(const struct mctp_sk_key *key, int reason), + TP_ARGS(key, reason), + TP_STRUCT__entry( + __field(__u8, paddr) + __field(__u8, laddr) + __field(__u8, tag) + __field(int, reason) + ), + TP_fast_assign( + __entry->paddr = key->peer_addr; + __entry->laddr = key->local_addr; + __entry->tag = key->tag; + __entry->reason = reason; + ), + TP_printk("local %d, peer %d, tag %1x %s", + __entry->laddr, + __entry->paddr, + __entry->tag, + __print_symbolic(__entry->reason, + { MCTP_TRACE_KEY_TIMEOUT, "timeout" }, + { MCTP_TRACE_KEY_REPLIED, "replied" }, + { MCTP_TRACE_KEY_INVALIDATED, "invalidated" }, + { MCTP_TRACE_KEY_CLOSED, "closed" }, + { MCTP_TRACE_KEY_DROPPED, "dropped" }) + ) +); + +#endif + +#include <trace/define_trace.h> |
