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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/trace/events/fsnotify.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/trace/events/fsnotify.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/trace/events/fsnotify.h | 51 |
1 files changed, 51 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/trace/events/fsnotify.h b/include/trace/events/fsnotify.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..341bbd57a --- /dev/null +++ b/include/trace/events/fsnotify.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#undef TRACE_SYSTEM +#define TRACE_SYSTEM fsnotify + +#if !defined(_TRACE_FSNOTIFY_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) +#define _TRACE_FSNOTIFY_H + +#include <linux/tracepoint.h> + +#include <trace/misc/fsnotify.h> + +TRACE_EVENT(fsnotify, + TP_PROTO(__u32 mask, const void *data, int data_type, + struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *file_name, + struct inode *inode, u32 cookie), + + TP_ARGS(mask, data, data_type, dir, file_name, inode, cookie), + + TP_STRUCT__entry( + __field(__u32, mask) + __field(unsigned long, dir_ino) + __field(unsigned long, ino) + __field(dev_t, s_dev) + __field(int, data_type) + __field(u32, cookie) + __string(file_name, file_name ? (const char *)file_name->name : "") + ), + + TP_fast_assign( + __entry->mask = mask; + __entry->dir_ino = dir ? dir->i_ino : 0; + __entry->ino = inode ? inode->i_ino : 0; + __entry->s_dev = dir ? dir->i_sb->s_dev : + inode ? inode->i_sb->s_dev : 0; + __entry->data_type = data_type; + __entry->cookie = cookie; + __assign_str(file_name); + ), + + TP_printk("dev=%d:%d dir=%lu ino=%lu data_type=%d cookie=0x%x mask=0x%x %s name=%s", + MAJOR(__entry->s_dev), MINOR(__entry->s_dev), + __entry->dir_ino, __entry->ino, + __entry->data_type, __entry->cookie, + __entry->mask, show_fsnotify_mask(__entry->mask), + __get_str(file_name)) +); + +#endif /* _TRACE_FSNOTIFY_H */ + +/* This part must be outside protection */ +#include <trace/define_trace.h> |
