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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /include/trace/events/capability.h | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/trace/events/capability.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/trace/events/capability.h | 57 |
1 files changed, 57 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/trace/events/capability.h b/include/trace/events/capability.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..173402579 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/trace/events/capability.h @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#undef TRACE_SYSTEM +#define TRACE_SYSTEM capability + +#if !defined(_TRACE_CAPABILITY_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) +#define _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H + +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/tracepoint.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> + +/** + * cap_capable - called after it's determined if a task has a particular + * effective capability + * + * @cred: The credentials used + * @target_ns: The user namespace of the resource being accessed + * @capable_ns: The user namespace in which the credential provides the + * capability to access the targeted resource. + * This will be NULL if ret is not 0. + * @cap: The capability to check for + * @ret: The return value of the check: 0 if it does, -ve if it does not + * + * Allows to trace calls to cap_capable in commoncap.c + */ +TRACE_EVENT(cap_capable, + + TP_PROTO(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *target_ns, + const struct user_namespace *capable_ns, int cap, int ret), + + TP_ARGS(cred, target_ns, capable_ns, cap, ret), + + TP_STRUCT__entry( + __field(const struct cred *, cred) + __field(struct user_namespace *, target_ns) + __field(const struct user_namespace *, capable_ns) + __field(int, cap) + __field(int, ret) + ), + + TP_fast_assign( + __entry->cred = cred; + __entry->target_ns = target_ns; + __entry->capable_ns = ret == 0 ? capable_ns : NULL; + __entry->cap = cap; + __entry->ret = ret; + ), + + TP_printk("cred %p, target_ns %p, capable_ns %p, cap %d, ret %d", + __entry->cred, __entry->target_ns, __entry->capable_ns, __entry->cap, + __entry->ret) +); + +#endif /* _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H */ + +/* This part must be outside protection */ +#include <trace/define_trace.h> |
