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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/trace/events/avc.h
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/trace/events/avc.h')
-rw-r--r--include/trace/events/avc.h53
1 files changed, 53 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/trace/events/avc.h b/include/trace/events/avc.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fed0f141d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/trace/events/avc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Authors: ThiƩbaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
+ * Peter Enderborg <Peter.Enderborg@sony.com>
+ */
+#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
+#define TRACE_SYSTEM avc
+
+#if !defined(_TRACE_SELINUX_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
+#define _TRACE_SELINUX_H
+
+#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
+
+TRACE_EVENT(selinux_audited,
+
+ TP_PROTO(struct selinux_audit_data *sad,
+ char *scontext,
+ char *tcontext,
+ const char *tclass
+ ),
+
+ TP_ARGS(sad, scontext, tcontext, tclass),
+
+ TP_STRUCT__entry(
+ __field(u32, requested)
+ __field(u32, denied)
+ __field(u32, audited)
+ __field(int, result)
+ __string(scontext, scontext)
+ __string(tcontext, tcontext)
+ __string(tclass, tclass)
+ ),
+
+ TP_fast_assign(
+ __entry->requested = sad->requested;
+ __entry->denied = sad->denied;
+ __entry->audited = sad->audited;
+ __entry->result = sad->result;
+ __assign_str(tcontext);
+ __assign_str(scontext);
+ __assign_str(tclass);
+ ),
+
+ TP_printk("requested=0x%x denied=0x%x audited=0x%x result=%d scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+ __entry->requested, __entry->denied, __entry->audited, __entry->result,
+ __get_str(scontext), __get_str(tcontext), __get_str(tclass)
+ )
+);
+
+#endif
+
+/* This part must be outside protection */
+#include <trace/define_trace.h>