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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/sound/ump_convert.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/sound/ump_convert.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/sound/ump_convert.h | 47 |
1 files changed, 47 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/sound/ump_convert.h b/include/sound/ump_convert.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..682499b87 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/sound/ump_convert.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +#ifndef __SOUND_UMP_CONVERT_H +#define __SOUND_UMP_CONVERT_H + +#include <sound/ump_msg.h> + +/* context for converting from legacy control messages to UMP packet */ +struct ump_cvt_to_ump_bank { + bool rpn_set; + bool nrpn_set; + bool bank_set; + unsigned char cc_rpn_msb, cc_rpn_lsb; + unsigned char cc_nrpn_msb, cc_nrpn_lsb; + unsigned char cc_data_msb, cc_data_lsb; + unsigned char cc_bank_msb, cc_bank_lsb; + bool cc_data_msb_set, cc_data_lsb_set; +}; + +/* context for converting from MIDI1 byte stream to UMP packet */ +struct ump_cvt_to_ump { + /* MIDI1 intermediate buffer */ + unsigned char buf[6]; /* up to 6 bytes for SysEx */ + int len; + int cmd_bytes; + + /* UMP output packet */ + u32 ump[4]; + int ump_bytes; + + /* various status */ + unsigned int in_sysex; + struct ump_cvt_to_ump_bank bank[16]; /* per channel */ +}; + +int snd_ump_convert_from_ump(const u32 *data, unsigned char *dst, + unsigned char *group_ret); +void snd_ump_convert_to_ump(struct ump_cvt_to_ump *cvt, unsigned char group, + unsigned int protocol, unsigned char c); + +/* reset the converter context, called at each open to ump */ +static inline void snd_ump_convert_reset(struct ump_cvt_to_ump *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); + +} + +#endif /* __SOUND_UMP_CONVERT_H */ |
