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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /include/soc/qcom/ice.h | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/soc/qcom/ice.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/soc/qcom/ice.h | 34 |
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/soc/qcom/ice.h b/include/soc/qcom/ice.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4bee553f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/soc/qcom/ice.h @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2023, Linaro Limited + */ + +#ifndef __QCOM_ICE_H__ +#define __QCOM_ICE_H__ + +#include <linux/blk-crypto.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +struct qcom_ice; + +int qcom_ice_enable(struct qcom_ice *ice); +int qcom_ice_resume(struct qcom_ice *ice); +int qcom_ice_suspend(struct qcom_ice *ice); +int qcom_ice_program_key(struct qcom_ice *ice, unsigned int slot, + const struct blk_crypto_key *blk_key); +int qcom_ice_evict_key(struct qcom_ice *ice, int slot); +enum blk_crypto_key_type qcom_ice_get_supported_key_type(struct qcom_ice *ice); +int qcom_ice_derive_sw_secret(struct qcom_ice *ice, + const u8 *eph_key, size_t eph_key_size, + u8 sw_secret[BLK_CRYPTO_SW_SECRET_SIZE]); +int qcom_ice_generate_key(struct qcom_ice *ice, + u8 lt_key[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_HW_WRAPPED_KEY_SIZE]); +int qcom_ice_prepare_key(struct qcom_ice *ice, + const u8 *lt_key, size_t lt_key_size, + u8 eph_key[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_HW_WRAPPED_KEY_SIZE]); +int qcom_ice_import_key(struct qcom_ice *ice, + const u8 *raw_key, size_t raw_key_size, + u8 lt_key[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_HW_WRAPPED_KEY_SIZE]); +struct qcom_ice *devm_of_qcom_ice_get(struct device *dev); + +#endif /* __QCOM_ICE_H__ */ |
