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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h | 48 |
1 files changed, 48 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h b/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..47a6cab75 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2024, Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef __QCOM_COMMAND_DB_H__ +#define __QCOM_COMMAND_DB_H__ + +#include <linux/err.h> + +enum cmd_db_hw_type { + CMD_DB_HW_INVALID = 0, + CMD_DB_HW_MIN = 3, + CMD_DB_HW_ARC = CMD_DB_HW_MIN, + CMD_DB_HW_VRM = 4, + CMD_DB_HW_BCM = 5, + CMD_DB_HW_MAX = CMD_DB_HW_BCM, + CMD_DB_HW_ALL = 0xff, +}; + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_QCOM_COMMAND_DB) +u32 cmd_db_read_addr(const char *resource_id); + +const void *cmd_db_read_aux_data(const char *resource_id, size_t *len); + +bool cmd_db_match_resource_addr(u32 addr1, u32 addr2); + +enum cmd_db_hw_type cmd_db_read_slave_id(const char *resource_id); + +int cmd_db_ready(void); +#else +static inline u32 cmd_db_read_addr(const char *resource_id) +{ return 0; } + +static inline const void *cmd_db_read_aux_data(const char *resource_id, size_t *len) +{ return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); } + +static inline bool cmd_db_match_resource_addr(u32 addr1, u32 addr2) +{ return false; } + +static inline enum cmd_db_hw_type cmd_db_read_slave_id(const char *resource_id) +{ return -ENODEV; } + +static inline int cmd_db_ready(void) +{ return -ENODEV; } +#endif /* CONFIG_QCOM_COMMAND_DB */ +#endif /* __QCOM_COMMAND_DB_H__ */ |
