usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate bRequest index in generic_{set,get}_cmdgrafted

generic_set_cmd() and generic_get_cmd() use the low nibble of
ctrl->bRequest as an index into con->data[]:

    u8 cmd = (ctrl->bRequest & 0x0F);  /* 0 .. 15 */
    ...
    con->data[cmd] = value;            /* OOB when cmd >= 5 */

struct usb_audio_control (include/linux/usb/audio.h) declares data as
a 5-element array, so indices 5 through 15 write (or read) up to 44
bytes past the end of the array on the heap.

A malicious USB host can craft a class-specific SET_CUR / GET_CUR
request with an arbitrary bRequest value, triggering the out-of-bounds
access from an IRQ completion handler with no further preconditions.

Add an ARRAY_SIZE() guard to both functions.

Fixes: c47d7b09891a ("USB: audio: add USB audio class definitions")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Weibin Liu <liuwb@xiaopeng.com>
Signed-off-by: Liu Chao <liuc63@xiaopeng.com>
Reviewed-by: Ivy Lopez <skunkolee@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921072551.3708191-1-liuc63@xiaopeng.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 22 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/include/net/vsock_addr.h b/include/net/vsock_addr.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c3f4cc206
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/vsock_addr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * VMware vSockets Driver
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2007-2013 VMware, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _VSOCK_ADDR_H_
+#define _VSOCK_ADDR_H_
+
+#include <uapi/linux/vm_sockets.h>
+
+void vsock_addr_init(struct sockaddr_vm *addr, u32 cid, u32 port);
+int vsock_addr_validate(const struct sockaddr_vm *addr);
+bool vsock_addr_bound(const struct sockaddr_vm *addr);
+void vsock_addr_unbind(struct sockaddr_vm *addr);
+bool vsock_addr_equals_addr(const struct sockaddr_vm *addr,
+			    const struct sockaddr_vm *other);
+int vsock_addr_cast(const struct sockaddr_unsized *addr, size_t len,
+		    struct sockaddr_vm **out_addr);
+
+#endif