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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/net/transp_v6.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/transp_v6.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/net/transp_v6.h | 63 |
1 files changed, 63 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/transp_v6.h b/include/net/transp_v6.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c0a421fe0 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/net/transp_v6.h @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _TRANSP_V6_H +#define _TRANSP_V6_H + +#include <net/checksum.h> +#include <net/sock.h> + +/* IPv6 transport protocols */ +extern struct proto rawv6_prot; +extern struct proto udpv6_prot; +extern struct proto tcpv6_prot; +extern struct proto pingv6_prot; + +struct flowi6; +struct ipcm6_cookie; + +/* extension headers */ +int ipv6_exthdrs_init(void); +void ipv6_exthdrs_exit(void); +int ipv6_frag_init(void); +void ipv6_frag_exit(void); + +/* transport protocols */ +int pingv6_init(void); +void pingv6_exit(void); +int rawv6_init(void); +void rawv6_exit(void); +int udpv6_init(void); +void udpv6_exit(void); +int tcpv6_init(void); +void tcpv6_exit(void); + +/* this does all the common and the specific ctl work */ +void ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, + struct sk_buff *skb); +void ip6_datagram_recv_common_ctl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, + struct sk_buff *skb); +void ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, + struct sk_buff *skb); + +int ip6_datagram_send_ctl(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, + struct flowi6 *fl6, struct ipcm6_cookie *ipc6); + +void __ip6_dgram_sock_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, struct sock *sp, + __u16 srcp, __u16 destp, int rqueue, int bucket); +static inline void +ip6_dgram_sock_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, struct sock *sp, __u16 srcp, + __u16 destp, int bucket) +{ + __ip6_dgram_sock_seq_show(seq, sp, srcp, destp, sk_rmem_alloc_get(sp), + bucket); +} + +#define LOOPBACK4_IPV6 cpu_to_be32(0x7f000006) + +#define IPV6_SEQ_DGRAM_HEADER \ + " sl " \ + "local_address " \ + "remote_address " \ + "st tx_queue rx_queue tr tm->when retrnsmt" \ + " uid timeout inode ref pointer drops\n" + +#endif |
