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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/net/transp_v6.h
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/transp_v6.h')
-rw-r--r--include/net/transp_v6.h63
1 files changed, 63 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/transp_v6.h b/include/net/transp_v6.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c0a421fe0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/transp_v6.h
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _TRANSP_V6_H
+#define _TRANSP_V6_H
+
+#include <net/checksum.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+
+/* IPv6 transport protocols */
+extern struct proto rawv6_prot;
+extern struct proto udpv6_prot;
+extern struct proto tcpv6_prot;
+extern struct proto pingv6_prot;
+
+struct flowi6;
+struct ipcm6_cookie;
+
+/* extension headers */
+int ipv6_exthdrs_init(void);
+void ipv6_exthdrs_exit(void);
+int ipv6_frag_init(void);
+void ipv6_frag_exit(void);
+
+/* transport protocols */
+int pingv6_init(void);
+void pingv6_exit(void);
+int rawv6_init(void);
+void rawv6_exit(void);
+int udpv6_init(void);
+void udpv6_exit(void);
+int tcpv6_init(void);
+void tcpv6_exit(void);
+
+/* this does all the common and the specific ctl work */
+void ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
+ struct sk_buff *skb);
+void ip6_datagram_recv_common_ctl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
+ struct sk_buff *skb);
+void ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
+ struct sk_buff *skb);
+
+int ip6_datagram_send_ctl(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
+ struct flowi6 *fl6, struct ipcm6_cookie *ipc6);
+
+void __ip6_dgram_sock_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, struct sock *sp,
+ __u16 srcp, __u16 destp, int rqueue, int bucket);
+static inline void
+ip6_dgram_sock_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, struct sock *sp, __u16 srcp,
+ __u16 destp, int bucket)
+{
+ __ip6_dgram_sock_seq_show(seq, sp, srcp, destp, sk_rmem_alloc_get(sp),
+ bucket);
+}
+
+#define LOOPBACK4_IPV6 cpu_to_be32(0x7f000006)
+
+#define IPV6_SEQ_DGRAM_HEADER \
+ " sl " \
+ "local_address " \
+ "remote_address " \
+ "st tx_queue rx_queue tr tm->when retrnsmt" \
+ " uid timeout inode ref pointer drops\n"
+
+#endif