diff options
| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /include/net/seg6_hmac.h | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/seg6_hmac.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/net/seg6_hmac.h | 60 |
1 files changed, 60 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/seg6_hmac.h b/include/net/seg6_hmac.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e9f417259 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/net/seg6_hmac.h @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ +/* + * SR-IPv6 implementation + * + * Author: + * David Lebrun <david.lebrun@uclouvain.be> + */ + +#ifndef _NET_SEG6_HMAC_H +#define _NET_SEG6_HMAC_H + +#include <crypto/sha1.h> +#include <crypto/sha2.h> +#include <net/flow.h> +#include <net/ip6_fib.h> +#include <net/sock.h> +#include <linux/ip.h> +#include <linux/ipv6.h> +#include <linux/route.h> +#include <net/seg6.h> +#include <linux/seg6_hmac.h> +#include <linux/rhashtable-types.h> + +#define SEG6_HMAC_RING_SIZE 256 + +struct seg6_hmac_info { + struct rhash_head node; + struct rcu_head rcu; + + u32 hmackeyid; + /* The raw key, kept only so it can be returned back to userspace */ + char secret[SEG6_HMAC_SECRET_LEN]; + u8 slen; + u8 alg_id; + /* The prepared key, which the calculations actually use */ + union { + struct hmac_sha1_key sha1; + struct hmac_sha256_key sha256; + } key; +}; + +extern int seg6_hmac_compute(struct seg6_hmac_info *hinfo, + struct ipv6_sr_hdr *hdr, struct in6_addr *saddr, + u8 *output); +extern struct seg6_hmac_info *seg6_hmac_info_lookup(struct net *net, u32 key); +extern int seg6_hmac_info_add(struct net *net, u32 key, + struct seg6_hmac_info *hinfo); +extern int seg6_hmac_info_del(struct net *net, u32 key); +extern int seg6_push_hmac(struct net *net, struct in6_addr *saddr, + struct ipv6_sr_hdr *srh); +extern bool seg6_hmac_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb); +#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_HMAC +extern int seg6_hmac_net_init(struct net *net); +extern void seg6_hmac_net_exit(struct net *net); +#else +static inline int seg6_hmac_net_init(struct net *net) { return 0; } +static inline void seg6_hmac_net_exit(struct net *net) {} +#endif + +#endif |
