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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /include/net/seg6_hmac.h
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/seg6_hmac.h')
-rw-r--r--include/net/seg6_hmac.h60
1 files changed, 60 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/seg6_hmac.h b/include/net/seg6_hmac.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e9f417259
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/seg6_hmac.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/*
+ * SR-IPv6 implementation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * David Lebrun <david.lebrun@uclouvain.be>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _NET_SEG6_HMAC_H
+#define _NET_SEG6_HMAC_H
+
+#include <crypto/sha1.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <net/ip6_fib.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/route.h>
+#include <net/seg6.h>
+#include <linux/seg6_hmac.h>
+#include <linux/rhashtable-types.h>
+
+#define SEG6_HMAC_RING_SIZE 256
+
+struct seg6_hmac_info {
+ struct rhash_head node;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+
+ u32 hmackeyid;
+ /* The raw key, kept only so it can be returned back to userspace */
+ char secret[SEG6_HMAC_SECRET_LEN];
+ u8 slen;
+ u8 alg_id;
+ /* The prepared key, which the calculations actually use */
+ union {
+ struct hmac_sha1_key sha1;
+ struct hmac_sha256_key sha256;
+ } key;
+};
+
+extern int seg6_hmac_compute(struct seg6_hmac_info *hinfo,
+ struct ipv6_sr_hdr *hdr, struct in6_addr *saddr,
+ u8 *output);
+extern struct seg6_hmac_info *seg6_hmac_info_lookup(struct net *net, u32 key);
+extern int seg6_hmac_info_add(struct net *net, u32 key,
+ struct seg6_hmac_info *hinfo);
+extern int seg6_hmac_info_del(struct net *net, u32 key);
+extern int seg6_push_hmac(struct net *net, struct in6_addr *saddr,
+ struct ipv6_sr_hdr *srh);
+extern bool seg6_hmac_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb);
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_HMAC
+extern int seg6_hmac_net_init(struct net *net);
+extern void seg6_hmac_net_exit(struct net *net);
+#else
+static inline int seg6_hmac_net_init(struct net *net) { return 0; }
+static inline void seg6_hmac_net_exit(struct net *net) {}
+#endif
+
+#endif