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| author | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2026-10-01 14:52:55 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> | 2026-10-01 18:39:27 +0200 |
| commit | 33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4 (patch) | |
| tree | 543be8029ab3d8a3a63994ae23385a053ed30029 /include/net/seg6_hmac.h | |
| download | linux-stable-33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4.tar.gz linux-stable-33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4.zip | |
selftests/bpf: Test packet range of pointers sharing an idgrafted
Add tests where two packet pointers share an id and tightening one
pointer's umax from its var_off would put it less than their constant
distance from the other's umax: with an index & 0x38 capped at 50, the
base pointer keeps umax 50, so the pointer 8 bytes further on must keep
umax 58, even though its known bits allow at most 56.
These refused a valid program or accepted an out-of-bounds access before
the fix:
- check the advanced copy, load through the base: valid, was refused;
- check the base, load the byte at base + 1 through a copy advanced by
8: was accepted;
- check base + 4, load 4 bytes at base + 2 through base + 8: reads two
bytes past the checked range, was accepted;
- the same as the second with data_meta pointers checked against data:
was accepted.
These pass with and without the fix and cover nearby paths:
- subtract an unknown scalar from a checked pointer and load below it
(the range is kept across a new id);
- reach a load through two paths whose checks cover 8 and 7 bytes after
the loaded pointer; the second path must not be pruned by the first;
- spill a copy of a pointer, check the pointer, fill the copy and load
one byte past the checked range: the load is refused, and the copy
has the range of the check.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20261001145255.855630-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/seg6_hmac.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/net/seg6_hmac.h | 60 |
1 files changed, 60 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/seg6_hmac.h b/include/net/seg6_hmac.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e9f417259 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/net/seg6_hmac.h @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ +/* + * SR-IPv6 implementation + * + * Author: + * David Lebrun <david.lebrun@uclouvain.be> + */ + +#ifndef _NET_SEG6_HMAC_H +#define _NET_SEG6_HMAC_H + +#include <crypto/sha1.h> +#include <crypto/sha2.h> +#include <net/flow.h> +#include <net/ip6_fib.h> +#include <net/sock.h> +#include <linux/ip.h> +#include <linux/ipv6.h> +#include <linux/route.h> +#include <net/seg6.h> +#include <linux/seg6_hmac.h> +#include <linux/rhashtable-types.h> + +#define SEG6_HMAC_RING_SIZE 256 + +struct seg6_hmac_info { + struct rhash_head node; + struct rcu_head rcu; + + u32 hmackeyid; + /* The raw key, kept only so it can be returned back to userspace */ + char secret[SEG6_HMAC_SECRET_LEN]; + u8 slen; + u8 alg_id; + /* The prepared key, which the calculations actually use */ + union { + struct hmac_sha1_key sha1; + struct hmac_sha256_key sha256; + } key; +}; + +extern int seg6_hmac_compute(struct seg6_hmac_info *hinfo, + struct ipv6_sr_hdr *hdr, struct in6_addr *saddr, + u8 *output); +extern struct seg6_hmac_info *seg6_hmac_info_lookup(struct net *net, u32 key); +extern int seg6_hmac_info_add(struct net *net, u32 key, + struct seg6_hmac_info *hinfo); +extern int seg6_hmac_info_del(struct net *net, u32 key); +extern int seg6_push_hmac(struct net *net, struct in6_addr *saddr, + struct ipv6_sr_hdr *srh); +extern bool seg6_hmac_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb); +#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_HMAC +extern int seg6_hmac_net_init(struct net *net); +extern void seg6_hmac_net_exit(struct net *net); +#else +static inline int seg6_hmac_net_init(struct net *net) { return 0; } +static inline void seg6_hmac_net_exit(struct net *net) {} +#endif + +#endif |
