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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /include/net/secure_seq.h
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/secure_seq.h')
-rw-r--r--include/net/secure_seq.h51
1 files changed, 51 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/secure_seq.h b/include/net/secure_seq.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6f9962291
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/secure_seq.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _NET_SECURE_SEQ
+#define _NET_SECURE_SEQ
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct net;
+extern struct net init_net;
+
+union tcp_seq_and_ts_off {
+ struct {
+ u32 seq;
+ u32 ts_off;
+ };
+ u64 hash64;
+};
+
+u64 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
+u64 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+ __be16 dport);
+union tcp_seq_and_ts_off
+secure_tcp_seq_and_ts_off(const struct net *net, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+ __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+
+static inline u32 secure_tcp_seq(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+ __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+{
+ union tcp_seq_and_ts_off ts;
+
+ ts = secure_tcp_seq_and_ts_off(&init_net, saddr, daddr,
+ sport, dport);
+
+ return ts.seq;
+}
+
+union tcp_seq_and_ts_off
+secure_tcpv6_seq_and_ts_off(const struct net *net, const __be32 *saddr,
+ const __be32 *daddr,
+ __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+
+static inline u32 secure_tcpv6_seq(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+ __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+{
+ union tcp_seq_and_ts_off ts;
+
+ ts = secure_tcpv6_seq_and_ts_off(&init_net, saddr, daddr,
+ sport, dport);
+
+ return ts.seq;
+}
+#endif /* _NET_SECURE_SEQ */