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authorKumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>2026-09-04 10:43:19 +0200
committerAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>2026-09-04 07:58:36 -0700
commit6668ed271eaefaa63e686bdfbedaeb7b8e492722 (patch)
tree58e8288fead484f6755ad0815fc74c3742663761 /include/net/scm.h
downloadlinux-stable-6668ed271eaefaa63e686bdfbedaeb7b8e492722.tar.gz
linux-stable-6668ed271eaefaa63e686bdfbedaeb7b8e492722.zip
selftests/bpf: Reject graph kptr use after RCU unlockgrafted
Add a sleepable verifier test that loads a graph-node local kptr in an explicit RCU read-side critical section, then passes its node to bpf_rbtree_remove() after the section ends. Before the verifier fix, the stale NON_OWN_REF flag makes the node look like a live borrowed reference and the program is accepted. After the fix, the pointer is demoted without NON_OWN_REF and the graph kfunc argument is rejected. Also exercise a graph kptr loaded while a spin lock provides implicit RCU protection. The pointer must be invalidated when the lock is released, which guards the required ordering between non-owning-reference invalidation and RCU demotion. Update the existing fault-protected load test state description. The post-unlock pointer no longer carries NON_OWN_REF, but remains readable because the load is rewritten to use BPF_PROBE_MEM. Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260904084325.52250-7-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/scm.h')
-rw-r--r--include/net/scm.h114
1 files changed, 114 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..86ae6bc10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __LINUX_NET_SCM_H
+#define __LINUX_NET_SCM_H
+
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/pid.h>
+#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <net/compat.h>
+
+/* Well, we should have at least one descriptor open
+ * to accept passed FDs 8)
+ */
+#define SCM_MAX_FD 253
+
+struct scm_creds {
+ u32 pid;
+ kuid_t uid;
+ kgid_t gid;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX
+struct unix_edge;
+#endif
+
+struct scm_fp_list {
+ short count;
+ short count_unix;
+ short max;
+#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX
+ bool inflight;
+ bool dead;
+ struct list_head vertices;
+ struct unix_edge *edges;
+#endif
+ struct user_struct *user;
+ struct file *fp[SCM_MAX_FD];
+};
+
+struct scm_cookie {
+ struct pid *pid; /* Skb credentials */
+ struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
+ struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+ u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
+#endif
+};
+
+void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, bool notrunc);
+void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, bool notrunc);
+int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
+void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm);
+struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+ security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
+}
+#else
+static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+
+static __inline__ void scm_set_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm,
+ struct pid *pid, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
+{
+ scm->pid = get_pid(pid);
+ scm->creds.pid = pid_vnr(pid);
+ scm->creds.uid = uid;
+ scm->creds.gid = gid;
+}
+
+static __inline__ void scm_destroy_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+ put_pid(scm->pid);
+ scm->pid = NULL;
+}
+
+static __inline__ void scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+ scm_destroy_cred(scm);
+ if (scm->fp)
+ __scm_destroy(scm);
+}
+
+static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+ struct scm_cookie *scm, bool forcecreds)
+{
+ memset(scm, 0, sizeof(*scm));
+ scm->creds.uid = INVALID_UID;
+ scm->creds.gid = INVALID_GID;
+ if (forcecreds)
+ scm_set_cred(scm, task_tgid(current), current_uid(), current_gid());
+ unix_get_peersec_dgram(sock, scm);
+ if (msg->msg_controllen <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ return __scm_send(sock, msg, scm);
+}
+
+void scm_recv(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+ struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags);
+void scm_recv_unix(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+ struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags);
+
+int scm_recv_one_fd(struct file *f, int __user *ufd, unsigned int flags,
+ bool notrunc);
+
+#endif /* __LINUX_NET_SCM_H */
+