diff options
| author | Kees Cook <kees+treewide@kernel.org> | 2026-09-02 15:31:14 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> | 2026-09-04 21:37:00 -0700 |
| commit | 3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d (patch) | |
| tree | c65086f9bdcd48c6360fb7cb4598bca084da1f32 /include/net/scm.h | |
| download | linux-stable-3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d.tar.gz linux-stable-3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d.zip | |
treewide: refresh kmalloc_obj() conversionsgrafted
This is another run of the Coccinelle script for converting kmalloc()
family of allocations to kmalloc_obj() via the existing rules in
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci
This catches both the set of kmalloc() uses added since the first
kmalloc_obj() conversions in v7.0 and adds a large group missed in the
first pass due to Coccinelle not interacting well with the cleanup.h
scoped_...() family of macros[1]. I worked around this with spatch's
"--macro-file" argument to a file with all the scoped_...() macros mapped
to Coccinelle's YACFE_ITERATOR[2] as that was the closest viable control
flow indicator I could find.
Build tested allmodconfig on x86, arm64, arm, loongarch, mips, powerpc,
riscv, and s390 with no new warnings.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202609021314.8A9C0B8@keescook/ [1]
Link: https://github.com/coccinelle/coccinelle/blob/master/standard.h [2]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees+treewide@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/scm.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/net/scm.h | 114 |
1 files changed, 114 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..86ae6bc10 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/net/scm.h @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __LINUX_NET_SCM_H +#define __LINUX_NET_SCM_H + +#include <linux/limits.h> +#include <linux/net.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/pid.h> +#include <linux/nsproxy.h> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h> +#include <net/compat.h> + +/* Well, we should have at least one descriptor open + * to accept passed FDs 8) + */ +#define SCM_MAX_FD 253 + +struct scm_creds { + u32 pid; + kuid_t uid; + kgid_t gid; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX +struct unix_edge; +#endif + +struct scm_fp_list { + short count; + short count_unix; + short max; +#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX + bool inflight; + bool dead; + struct list_head vertices; + struct unix_edge *edges; +#endif + struct user_struct *user; + struct file *fp[SCM_MAX_FD]; +}; + +struct scm_cookie { + struct pid *pid; /* Skb credentials */ + struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */ + struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK + u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */ +#endif +}; + +void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, bool notrunc); +void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, bool notrunc); +int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm); +void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm); +struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK +static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm) +{ + security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid); +} +#else +static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm) +{ } +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ + +static __inline__ void scm_set_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm, + struct pid *pid, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) +{ + scm->pid = get_pid(pid); + scm->creds.pid = pid_vnr(pid); + scm->creds.uid = uid; + scm->creds.gid = gid; +} + +static __inline__ void scm_destroy_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm) +{ + put_pid(scm->pid); + scm->pid = NULL; +} + +static __inline__ void scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm) +{ + scm_destroy_cred(scm); + if (scm->fp) + __scm_destroy(scm); +} + +static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, + struct scm_cookie *scm, bool forcecreds) +{ + memset(scm, 0, sizeof(*scm)); + scm->creds.uid = INVALID_UID; + scm->creds.gid = INVALID_GID; + if (forcecreds) + scm_set_cred(scm, task_tgid(current), current_uid(), current_gid()); + unix_get_peersec_dgram(sock, scm); + if (msg->msg_controllen <= 0) + return 0; + return __scm_send(sock, msg, scm); +} + +void scm_recv(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, + struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags); +void scm_recv_unix(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, + struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags); + +int scm_recv_one_fd(struct file *f, int __user *ufd, unsigned int flags, + bool notrunc); + +#endif /* __LINUX_NET_SCM_H */ + |
