usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate bRequest index in generic_{set,get}_cmdgrafted

generic_set_cmd() and generic_get_cmd() use the low nibble of
ctrl->bRequest as an index into con->data[]:

    u8 cmd = (ctrl->bRequest & 0x0F);  /* 0 .. 15 */
    ...
    con->data[cmd] = value;            /* OOB when cmd >= 5 */

struct usb_audio_control (include/linux/usb/audio.h) declares data as
a 5-element array, so indices 5 through 15 write (or read) up to 44
bytes past the end of the array on the heap.

A malicious USB host can craft a class-specific SET_CUR / GET_CUR
request with an arbitrary bRequest value, triggering the out-of-bounds
access from an IRQ completion handler with no further preconditions.

Add an ARRAY_SIZE() guard to both functions.

Fixes: c47d7b09891a ("USB: audio: add USB audio class definitions")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Weibin Liu <liuwb@xiaopeng.com>
Signed-off-by: Liu Chao <liuc63@xiaopeng.com>
Reviewed-by: Ivy Lopez <skunkolee@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921072551.3708191-1-liuc63@xiaopeng.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 27 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/include/net/pptp.h b/include/net/pptp.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e63176bdd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/pptp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _NET_PPTP_H
+#define _NET_PPTP_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <net/gre.h>
+
+#define PPP_LCP_ECHOREQ 0x09
+#define PPP_LCP_ECHOREP 0x0A
+#define SC_RCV_BITS     (SC_RCV_B7_1|SC_RCV_B7_0|SC_RCV_ODDP|SC_RCV_EVNP)
+
+#define MISSING_WINDOW 20
+#define WRAPPED(curseq, lastseq)\
+	((((curseq) & 0xffffff00) == 0) &&\
+	(((lastseq) & 0xffffff00) == 0xffffff00))
+
+#define PPTP_HEADER_OVERHEAD (2+sizeof(struct pptp_gre_header))
+struct pptp_gre_header {
+	struct gre_base_hdr gre_hd;
+	__be16 payload_len;
+	__be16 call_id;
+	__be32 seq;
+	__be32 ack;
+} __packed;
+
+
+#endif