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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/net/netns/conntrack.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/netns/conntrack.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/net/netns/conntrack.h | 100 |
1 files changed, 100 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/netns/conntrack.h b/include/net/netns/conntrack.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ab74b5ed0 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/net/netns/conntrack.h @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __NETNS_CONNTRACK_H +#define __NETNS_CONNTRACK_H + +#include <linux/list.h> +#include <linux/list_nulls.h> +#include <linux/atomic.h> +#include <linux/workqueue.h> +#include <linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_SCTP +#include <linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sctp.h> +#endif +#include <linux/seqlock.h> + +struct ctl_table_header; +struct nf_conntrack_ecache; + +struct nf_generic_net { + unsigned int timeout; +}; + +struct nf_tcp_net { + unsigned int timeouts[TCP_CONNTRACK_TIMEOUT_MAX]; + u8 tcp_loose; + u8 tcp_be_liberal; + u8 tcp_max_retrans; + u8 tcp_ignore_invalid_rst; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_FLOW_TABLE) + unsigned int offload_timeout; +#endif +}; + +enum udp_conntrack { + UDP_CT_UNREPLIED, + UDP_CT_REPLIED, + UDP_CT_MAX +}; + +struct nf_udp_net { + unsigned int timeouts[UDP_CT_MAX]; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_FLOW_TABLE) + unsigned int offload_timeout; +#endif +}; + +struct nf_icmp_net { + unsigned int timeout; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_SCTP +struct nf_sctp_net { + unsigned int timeouts[SCTP_CONNTRACK_MAX]; +}; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_GRE +enum gre_conntrack { + GRE_CT_UNREPLIED, + GRE_CT_REPLIED, + GRE_CT_MAX +}; + +struct nf_gre_net { + struct list_head keymap_list; + unsigned int timeouts[GRE_CT_MAX]; +}; +#endif + +struct nf_ip_net { + struct nf_generic_net generic; + struct nf_tcp_net tcp; + struct nf_udp_net udp; + struct nf_icmp_net icmp; + struct nf_icmp_net icmpv6; +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_SCTP + struct nf_sctp_net sctp; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_GRE + struct nf_gre_net gre; +#endif +}; + +struct netns_ct { +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS + bool ecache_dwork_pending; +#endif + u8 sysctl_log_invalid; /* Log invalid packets */ + u8 sysctl_events; + u8 sysctl_acct; + u8 sysctl_tstamp; + u8 sysctl_checksum; + + struct ip_conntrack_stat __percpu *stat; + struct nf_ct_event_notifier __rcu *nf_conntrack_event_cb; + struct nf_ip_net nf_ct_proto; +#if defined(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_LABELS) + atomic_t labels_used; +#endif +}; +#endif |
