staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 28 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/include/net/netns/bpf.h b/include/net/netns/bpf.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2c01a278d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/netns/bpf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * BPF programs attached to network namespace
+ */
+
+#ifndef __NETNS_BPF_H__
+#define __NETNS_BPF_H__
+
+#include <linux/list.h>
+
+struct bpf_prog;
+struct bpf_prog_array;
+
+enum netns_bpf_attach_type {
+	NETNS_BPF_INVALID = -1,
+	NETNS_BPF_FLOW_DISSECTOR = 0,
+	NETNS_BPF_SK_LOOKUP,
+	MAX_NETNS_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE
+};
+
+struct netns_bpf {
+	/* Array of programs to run compiled from progs or links */
+	struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *run_array[MAX_NETNS_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE];
+	struct bpf_prog *progs[MAX_NETNS_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE];
+	struct list_head links[MAX_NETNS_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE];
+};
+
+#endif /* __NETNS_BPF_H__ */