openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 21 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/include/net/ipcomp.h b/include/net/ipcomp.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..51401f01e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/ipcomp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _NET_IPCOMP_H
+#define _NET_IPCOMP_H
+
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+
+struct ip_comp_hdr;
+struct netlink_ext_ack;
+struct xfrm_state;
+
+int ipcomp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb);
+int ipcomp_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb);
+void ipcomp_destroy(struct xfrm_state *x);
+int ipcomp_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack);
+
+static inline struct ip_comp_hdr *ip_comp_hdr(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return (struct ip_comp_hdr *)skb_transport_header(skb);
+}
+
+#endif