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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/net/inet_dscp.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/inet_dscp.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/net/inet_dscp.h | 63 |
1 files changed, 63 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/inet_dscp.h b/include/net/inet_dscp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1aa9f04ed --- /dev/null +++ b/include/net/inet_dscp.h @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ +/* + * inet_dscp.h: helpers for handling differentiated services codepoints (DSCP) + * + * DSCP is defined in RFC 2474: + * + * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 + * +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + * | DSCP | CU | + * +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ + * + * DSCP: differentiated services codepoint + * CU: currently unused + * + * The whole DSCP + CU bits form the DS field. + * The DS field is also commonly called TOS or Traffic Class (for IPv6). + * + * Note: the CU bits are now used for Explicit Congestion Notification + * (RFC 3168). + */ + +#ifndef _INET_DSCP_H +#define _INET_DSCP_H + +#include <linux/types.h> + +/* Special type for storing DSCP values. + * + * A dscp_t variable stores a DS field with the CU (ECN) bits cleared. + * Using dscp_t allows to strictly separate DSCP and ECN bits, thus avoiding + * bugs where ECN bits are erroneously taken into account during FIB lookups + * or policy routing. + * + * Note: to get the real DSCP value contained in a dscp_t variable one would + * have to do a bit shift after calling inet_dscp_to_dsfield(). We could have + * a helper for that, but there's currently no users. + */ +typedef u8 __bitwise dscp_t; + +#define INET_DSCP_MASK 0xfc + +/* A few places in the IPv4 code need to ignore the three high order bits of + * DSCP because of backward compatibility (as these bits used to represent the + * IPv4 Precedence in RFC 791's TOS field and were ignored). + */ +#define INET_DSCP_LEGACY_TOS_MASK ((__force dscp_t)0x1c) + +static inline dscp_t inet_dsfield_to_dscp(__u8 dsfield) +{ + return (__force dscp_t)(dsfield & INET_DSCP_MASK); +} + +static inline __u8 inet_dscp_to_dsfield(dscp_t dscp) +{ + return (__force __u8)dscp; +} + +static inline bool inet_validate_dscp(__u8 val) +{ + return !(val & ~INET_DSCP_MASK); +} + +#endif /* _INET_DSCP_H */ |
