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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/net/inet_common.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/inet_common.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/net/inet_common.h | 82 |
1 files changed, 82 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/inet_common.h b/include/net/inet_common.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3d747896b --- /dev/null +++ b/include/net/inet_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _INET_COMMON_H +#define _INET_COMMON_H + +#include <linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h> +#include <linux/net.h> +#include <linux/netdev_features.h> +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <net/sock.h> + +extern const struct proto_ops inet_stream_ops; +extern const struct proto_ops inet_dgram_ops; + +/* + * INET4 prototypes used by INET6 + */ + +struct msghdr; +struct net; +struct page; +struct sock; +struct socket; + +int inet_release(struct socket *sock); +int inet_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr, + int addr_len, int flags); +int __inet_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr, + int addr_len, int flags, int is_sendmsg); +int inet_dgram_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr, + int addr_len, int flags); +int inet_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock, + struct proto_accept_arg *arg); +void __inet_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock, + struct sock *newsk); +int inet_send_prepare(struct sock *sk); +int inet_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size); +void inet_splice_eof(struct socket *sock); +int inet_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, + int flags); +int inet_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how); +int inet_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog); +int __inet_listen_sk(struct sock *sk, int backlog); +void inet_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk); +int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr, int addr_len); +int inet_bind_sk(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr, int addr_len); +/* Don't allocate port at this moment, defer to connect. */ +#define BIND_FORCE_ADDRESS_NO_PORT (1 << 0) +/* Grab and release socket lock. */ +#define BIND_WITH_LOCK (1 << 1) +/* Called from BPF program. */ +#define BIND_FROM_BPF (1 << 2) +/* Skip CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE check. */ +#define BIND_NO_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE (1 << 3) +int __inet_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr, int addr_len, + u32 flags); +int inet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, + int peer); +int inet_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); +int inet_ctl_sock_create(struct sock **sk, unsigned short family, + unsigned short type, unsigned char protocol, + struct net *net); +int inet_recv_error(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int len); + +struct sk_buff *inet_gro_receive(struct list_head *head, struct sk_buff *skb); +int inet_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhoff); +struct sk_buff *inet_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, + netdev_features_t features); + +static inline void inet_ctl_sock_destroy(struct sock *sk) +{ + if (sk) + sock_release(sk->sk_socket); +} + +#define indirect_call_gro_receive(f2, f1, cb, head, skb) \ +({ \ + unlikely(gro_recursion_inc_test(skb)) ? \ + NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush |= 1, NULL : \ + INDIRECT_CALL_2(cb, f2, f1, head, skb); \ +}) + +#endif |
