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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/net/inet_common.h
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/inet_common.h')
-rw-r--r--include/net/inet_common.h82
1 files changed, 82 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/inet_common.h b/include/net/inet_common.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3d747896b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/inet_common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _INET_COMMON_H
+#define _INET_COMMON_H
+
+#include <linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/netdev_features.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+
+extern const struct proto_ops inet_stream_ops;
+extern const struct proto_ops inet_dgram_ops;
+
+/*
+ * INET4 prototypes used by INET6
+ */
+
+struct msghdr;
+struct net;
+struct page;
+struct sock;
+struct socket;
+
+int inet_release(struct socket *sock);
+int inet_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr,
+ int addr_len, int flags);
+int __inet_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr,
+ int addr_len, int flags, int is_sendmsg);
+int inet_dgram_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr,
+ int addr_len, int flags);
+int inet_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock,
+ struct proto_accept_arg *arg);
+void __inet_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock,
+ struct sock *newsk);
+int inet_send_prepare(struct sock *sk);
+int inet_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size);
+void inet_splice_eof(struct socket *sock);
+int inet_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
+ int flags);
+int inet_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
+int inet_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog);
+int __inet_listen_sk(struct sock *sk, int backlog);
+void inet_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk);
+int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr, int addr_len);
+int inet_bind_sk(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr, int addr_len);
+/* Don't allocate port at this moment, defer to connect. */
+#define BIND_FORCE_ADDRESS_NO_PORT (1 << 0)
+/* Grab and release socket lock. */
+#define BIND_WITH_LOCK (1 << 1)
+/* Called from BPF program. */
+#define BIND_FROM_BPF (1 << 2)
+/* Skip CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE check. */
+#define BIND_NO_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE (1 << 3)
+int __inet_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr, int addr_len,
+ u32 flags);
+int inet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
+ int peer);
+int inet_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
+int inet_ctl_sock_create(struct sock **sk, unsigned short family,
+ unsigned short type, unsigned char protocol,
+ struct net *net);
+int inet_recv_error(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int len);
+
+struct sk_buff *inet_gro_receive(struct list_head *head, struct sk_buff *skb);
+int inet_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhoff);
+struct sk_buff *inet_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ netdev_features_t features);
+
+static inline void inet_ctl_sock_destroy(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ if (sk)
+ sock_release(sk->sk_socket);
+}
+
+#define indirect_call_gro_receive(f2, f1, cb, head, skb) \
+({ \
+ unlikely(gro_recursion_inc_test(skb)) ? \
+ NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush |= 1, NULL : \
+ INDIRECT_CALL_2(cb, f2, f1, head, skb); \
+})
+
+#endif