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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/net/inet6_hashtables.h
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/inet6_hashtables.h')
-rw-r--r--include/net/inet6_hashtables.h191
1 files changed, 191 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/inet6_hashtables.h b/include/net/inet6_hashtables.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2cc5d416b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/inet6_hashtables.h
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/*
+ * INET An implementation of the TCP/IP protocol suite for the LINUX
+ * operating system. INET is implemented using the BSD Socket
+ * interface as the means of communication with the user level.
+ *
+ * Authors: Lotsa people, from code originally in tcp
+ */
+
+#ifndef _INET6_HASHTABLES_H
+#define _INET6_HASHTABLES_H
+
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/jhash.h>
+
+#include <net/inet_sock.h>
+
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/netns/hash.h>
+
+struct inet_hashinfo;
+
+void inet6_init_ehash_secret(void);
+
+static inline unsigned int __inet6_ehashfn(const u32 lhash,
+ const u16 lport,
+ const u32 fhash,
+ const __be16 fport,
+ const u32 initval)
+{
+ const u32 ports = (((u32)lport) << 16) | (__force u32)fport;
+ return jhash_3words(lhash, fhash, ports, initval);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sockets in TCP_CLOSE state are _always_ taken out of the hash, so
+ * we need not check it for TCP lookups anymore, thanks Alexey. -DaveM
+ *
+ * The sockhash lock must be held as a reader here.
+ */
+struct sock *__inet6_lookup_established(const struct net *net,
+ const struct in6_addr *saddr,
+ const __be16 sport,
+ const struct in6_addr *daddr,
+ const u16 hnum, const int dif,
+ const int sdif);
+
+typedef u32 (inet6_ehashfn_t)(const struct net *net,
+ const struct in6_addr *laddr, const u16 lport,
+ const struct in6_addr *faddr, const __be16 fport);
+
+inet6_ehashfn_t inet6_ehashfn;
+
+INDIRECT_CALLABLE_DECLARE(inet6_ehashfn_t udp6_ehashfn);
+
+struct sock *inet6_lookup_reuseport(const struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, int doff,
+ const struct in6_addr *saddr,
+ __be16 sport,
+ const struct in6_addr *daddr,
+ unsigned short hnum,
+ inet6_ehashfn_t *ehashfn);
+
+struct sock *inet6_lookup_listener(const struct net *net,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, int doff,
+ const struct in6_addr *saddr,
+ const __be16 sport,
+ const struct in6_addr *daddr,
+ const unsigned short hnum,
+ const int dif, const int sdif);
+
+struct sock *inet6_lookup_run_sk_lookup(const struct net *net,
+ int protocol,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, int doff,
+ const struct in6_addr *saddr,
+ const __be16 sport,
+ const struct in6_addr *daddr,
+ const u16 hnum, const int dif,
+ inet6_ehashfn_t *ehashfn);
+
+static inline struct sock *__inet6_lookup(const struct net *net,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, int doff,
+ const struct in6_addr *saddr,
+ const __be16 sport,
+ const struct in6_addr *daddr,
+ const u16 hnum,
+ const int dif, const int sdif,
+ bool *refcounted)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = __inet6_lookup_established(net, saddr, sport,
+ daddr, hnum,
+ dif, sdif);
+ *refcounted = true;
+ if (sk)
+ return sk;
+ *refcounted = false;
+ return inet6_lookup_listener(net, skb, doff, saddr, sport,
+ daddr, hnum, dif, sdif);
+}
+
+static inline
+struct sock *inet6_steal_sock(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, int doff,
+ const struct in6_addr *saddr, const __be16 sport,
+ const struct in6_addr *daddr, const __be16 dport,
+ bool *refcounted, inet6_ehashfn_t *ehashfn)
+{
+ struct sock *sk, *reuse_sk;
+ bool prefetched;
+
+ sk = skb_steal_sock(skb, refcounted, &prefetched);
+ if (!sk)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!prefetched || !sk_fullsock(sk))
+ return sk;
+
+ if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) {
+ if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)
+ return sk;
+ } else if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP) {
+ if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE)
+ return sk;
+ } else {
+ return sk;
+ }
+
+ reuse_sk = inet6_lookup_reuseport(net, sk, skb, doff,
+ saddr, sport, daddr, ntohs(dport),
+ ehashfn);
+ if (!reuse_sk)
+ return sk;
+
+ /* We've chosen a new reuseport sock which is never refcounted. This
+ * implies that sk also isn't refcounted.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(*refcounted);
+
+ return reuse_sk;
+}
+
+static inline struct sock *__inet6_lookup_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int doff,
+ const __be16 sport,
+ const __be16 dport,
+ int iif, int sdif,
+ bool *refcounted)
+{
+ struct net *net = skb_dst_dev_net_rcu(skb);
+ const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+ struct sock *sk;
+
+ sk = inet6_steal_sock(net, skb, doff, &ip6h->saddr, sport, &ip6h->daddr, dport,
+ refcounted, inet6_ehashfn);
+ if (IS_ERR(sk))
+ return NULL;
+ if (sk)
+ return sk;
+
+ return __inet6_lookup(net, skb, doff, &ip6h->saddr, sport,
+ &ip6h->daddr, ntohs(dport),
+ iif, sdif, refcounted);
+}
+
+struct sock *inet6_lookup(const struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, int doff,
+ const struct in6_addr *saddr, const __be16 sport,
+ const struct in6_addr *daddr, const __be16 dport,
+ const int dif);
+
+static inline bool inet6_match(const struct net *net, const struct sock *sk,
+ const struct in6_addr *saddr,
+ const struct in6_addr *daddr,
+ const __portpair ports,
+ const int dif, const int sdif)
+{
+ if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk), net) ||
+ sk->sk_family != AF_INET6 ||
+ READ_ONCE(sk->sk_portpair) != ports ||
+ !ipv6_addr_equal(&sk->sk_v6_daddr, saddr) ||
+ !ipv6_addr_equal(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr, daddr))
+ return false;
+
+ /* READ_ONCE() paired with WRITE_ONCE() in sock_bindtoindex_locked() */
+ return inet_sk_bound_dev_eq(net, READ_ONCE(sk->sk_bound_dev_if), dif,
+ sdif);
+}
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
+
+#endif /* _INET6_HASHTABLES_H */