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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/net/hotdata.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/hotdata.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/net/hotdata.h | 65 |
1 files changed, 65 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/hotdata.h b/include/net/hotdata.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..62534d1f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/net/hotdata.h @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ +#ifndef _NET_HOTDATA_H +#define _NET_HOTDATA_H + +#include <linux/llist.h> +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/netdevice.h> +#include <net/protocol.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_RPS +#include <net/rps-types.h> +#endif + +struct skb_defer_node { + struct llist_head defer_list; + atomic_long_t defer_count; +} ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp; + +/* Read mostly data used in network fast paths. */ +struct net_hotdata { +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) + struct packet_offload ip_packet_offload; + struct net_offload tcpv4_offload; + struct net_protocol tcp_protocol; + struct net_offload udpv4_offload; + struct net_protocol udp_protocol; + struct packet_offload ipv6_packet_offload; + struct net_offload tcpv6_offload; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + struct inet6_protocol tcpv6_protocol; + struct inet6_protocol udpv6_protocol; +#endif + struct net_offload udpv6_offload; +#endif + struct list_head offload_base; + struct kmem_cache *skbuff_cache; + struct kmem_cache *skbuff_fclone_cache; + struct kmem_cache *skb_small_head_cache; +#ifdef CONFIG_RPS + rps_tag_ptr rps_sock_flow_table; + u32 rps_cpu_mask; +#endif + struct skb_defer_node __percpu *skb_defer_nodes; + int gro_normal_batch; + int netdev_budget; + int netdev_budget_usecs; + int tstamp_prequeue; + int max_backlog; + int qdisc_max_burst; + int dev_tx_weight; + int dev_rx_weight; + int sysctl_max_skb_frags; + int sysctl_skb_defer_max; + int sysctl_mem_pcpu_rsv; +}; + +#define inet_ehash_secret net_hotdata.tcp_protocol.secret +#define udp_ehash_secret net_hotdata.udp_protocol.secret +#define inet6_ehash_secret net_hotdata.tcpv6_protocol.secret +#define tcp_ipv6_hash_secret net_hotdata.tcpv6_offload.secret +#define udp6_ehash_secret net_hotdata.udpv6_protocol.secret +#define udp_ipv6_hash_secret net_hotdata.udpv6_offload.secret + +extern struct net_hotdata net_hotdata; + +#endif /* _NET_HOTDATA_H */ |
