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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/net/handshake.h
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linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/handshake.h')
-rw-r--r--include/net/handshake.h49
1 files changed, 49 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/handshake.h b/include/net/handshake.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8ebd4f9ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/handshake.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Generic netlink HANDSHAKE service.
+ *
+ * Author: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2023, Oracle and/or its affiliates.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _NET_HANDSHAKE_H
+#define _NET_HANDSHAKE_H
+
+enum {
+ TLS_NO_KEYRING = 0,
+ TLS_NO_PEERID = 0,
+ TLS_NO_CERT = 0,
+ TLS_NO_PRIVKEY = 0,
+};
+
+typedef void (*tls_done_func_t)(void *data, int status,
+ key_serial_t peerid);
+
+struct tls_handshake_args {
+ struct socket *ta_sock;
+ tls_done_func_t ta_done;
+ void *ta_data;
+ const char *ta_peername;
+ unsigned int ta_timeout_ms;
+ key_serial_t ta_keyring;
+ key_serial_t ta_my_cert;
+ key_serial_t ta_my_privkey;
+ unsigned int ta_num_peerids;
+ key_serial_t ta_my_peerids[5];
+};
+
+int tls_client_hello_anon(const struct tls_handshake_args *args, gfp_t flags);
+int tls_client_hello_x509(const struct tls_handshake_args *args, gfp_t flags);
+int tls_client_hello_psk(const struct tls_handshake_args *args, gfp_t flags);
+int tls_server_hello_x509(const struct tls_handshake_args *args, gfp_t flags);
+int tls_server_hello_psk(const struct tls_handshake_args *args, gfp_t flags);
+
+bool tls_handshake_cancel(struct sock *sk);
+void tls_handshake_close(struct socket *sock);
+
+u8 tls_get_record_type(const struct sock *sk, const struct cmsghdr *msg);
+void tls_alert_recv(const struct sock *sk, const struct msghdr *msg,
+ u8 *level, u8 *description);
+
+#endif /* _NET_HANDSHAKE_H */